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Abstract
In this thesis we attempt to address the complex issue of the relationship between
trauma, dissociation, and psychosis. We start by providing a brief presentation of the
background to this thesis, which is followed by an outline of the main clinical aspects
and theories of psychosis. Subsequently, a broad evolutionary overview of trauma is
given within which existing influential cognitive theories of PTSD are placed. Current
models of dissociation are then reviewed and related to the view of trauma and traumatic
stress reactions previously outlined, before providing an evaluative synthesis of the
theoretical approaches and convergent conceptualisations of trauma, dissociation, and
psychosis in order to disentangle some of the plausible processes underlying their
relationship.
It was hypothesised that dissociation, occurring as a result of trauma (experience of
psychosis), plays a key role in the formation and maintenance of psychotic symptoms,
chiefly hallucinations and delusions. We used methods from experimental
psychopathology to investigate the potential role played by dissociative processes in the
disruption of the cognitive processes of attention and memory for trauma-related,
positive and neutral information in two groups of participants: 30 individuals with
psychosis and 30 matched controls. In particular, we used self-report measures of
symptomatology, recovery style, trauma-related symptoms, and dissociation, and
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employed two experimental tasks. The first was specifically devised to assess attentional
processes: a Directed Forgetting Stroop Task (DFST) performed under conditions of
divided attention. The second task was a Word-Stem Completion Task (WSCT) on
which we applied the process dissociation procedure (PDP; Jacoby, 1991) in order to
estimate the relative contribution to dissociation of implicit and explicit memory.
As expected, our findings revealed that compared to controls the experimental group
processed information preferentially in an implicit manner, and that this effect was
predicted by levels of dissociation and trauma-related distress. Although enhanced
unconscious memory was not specific to trauma-related material, it significantly
contributed to the level of positive symptomatology when mediated by stress levels. In
contrast, the contribution of recovery style in the maintenance of psychotic symptoms
was not supported, although this may reflect a limitation of the self-report measures
employed in our study. Contrary to what was hypothesised, we did not find a standard
directed forgetting effect in our memory task or an advantage (less interference due to
dissociation) in our task of divided attention.
Results are discussed in the light of the theoretical background, previous experimental
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Chapter 1
Psychosis: clinical aspects and theories
"As an experience, madness is terrific...
and in its lava I still find most of the things I write about."
(Virginia Woolf, "Letter to Ethel Smyth, 22 June 1930")
1.1. General introduction.
In recent years, increasing interest and attention have been paid to the relationships
among psychological trauma, psychotic episodes, dissociative phenomena, and cognitive
functions of attention and memory (e.g. Allen, Coyne & Console, 1997; DePrince &
Freyd, 2001; Gershuny & Thayer, 1999; Morrison, Frame & Larkin, 2003; Siegel,
1996).
It is widely accepted that exposure to subjectively traumatic life events may lead to
psychological distress and contribute to the development of psychopathology in some
individuals (e.g. Brewin, Andrews & Valentine, 2000; Christopher, 2004).
The definition of what constitutes psychological trauma or traumatic life events varies
across studies. Consequently, in reviewing the literature we shall necessarily include
studies that have used heterogeneous criteria and methodologies in their investigations.
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The prevalence rate of traumatic events in individuals with psychosis is particularly
high, with studies reporting up to 98% of their clinical samples having experienced at
least one traumatic event (e.g. child abuse, physical attack) in their lifetime (e.g. Mueser,
Goodman, Trumbetta, Rosenberg, Osher, Vidaver, Auciello & Foy, 1998; Resnick,
Bond & Mueser, 2003; Seedat, Stein, Oosthuizen, Emsley & Stein, 2003).
Moreover, and in addition to the presence of a trauma history as a distal contributory
factor to the development of psychosis, several authors have also examined the traumatic
nature of the development of an acute psychotic episode and the experience of residual
symptoms (e.g. McGorry, Chanen, McCarthy, van Riel, McKenzie & Singh, 1991;
Meyer, Taiminen, Vuori, Aijala & Helenius, 1999; Shaw, McFarlane, Bookless & Air,
2002; Stampfer, 1990). Specifically, it has been argued that the occurrence of psychosis
may be seen as a traumatic life event in itself, which in some individuals may lead to the
development of post-psychotic post-traumatic stress disorder (PP-PTSD) symptoms and
constitute aproximal contributory cause of poor prognosis and relapse.
Dissociative processes (e.g. depersonalisation, derealisation, emotional numbing,
explicit - but not implicit - memory loss) are considered to be a functional defensive
response during the experience of trauma which moderate the psychological impact of
distressing events on an individual (e.g. Kihlstrom, 2001; van der Kolk, Pelcovitz, Roth,
Mandel, McFarlane & Herman, 1996). However, peritraumatic dissociation and high
trait dissociation have also been associated with an increase in PTSD symptoms
following trauma (e.g. Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002; Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss,
2003; Shalev, Peri, Canetti, Schreiber, 1996).
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The relationship between dissociation and psychotic symptoms is generally recognised
(e.g. Allen & Coyne, 1995) as is its aetiology in traumatic experiences (e.g. Steinberg,
1995). Specifically, Allen and colleagues (1995; 1996; 1997) have suggested that
dissociation (dissociative detachment, in particular) increases vulnerability to psychotic
episodes in that "the anxiety-driven retreat into dissociative detachment undermines
patients' moorings in reality and may render them more vulnerable to flashbacks
associated with the activation of traumatic memory networks" (1996; p. 641).
Indeed, both clinical practice and research (e.g. Read & Argyle, 1999) indicate that
delusions and/or hallucinations can often reflect the content of past trauma. Therefore,
although dissociation may be an adaptive defence mechanism during the experience of
trauma, it may also be maladaptive later on, by blurring the boundaries between inner vs.
outer, past vs. present, and lead to impairment in reality testing, disorganised thinking
and increased vulnerability to further psychotic episodes.
It has been noted that PTSD and psychotic symptoms contain some phenomenological
similarities (e.g. Butler, Mueser, Sprock & Braff, 1996; Nayani & David, 1996). For
instance, intrusive recollections or "flashbacks" characteristic of PTSD are often
experienced in the form of visual, auditory, olfactory or tactile hallucinations, and are
accompanied by paranoia; whereas, other symptoms such as increased arousal,
hypervigilance, disturbed sleep, emotional numbing, detachment and derealisation,
appear to be common to the two disorders.
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As we shall see in more detail later in this thesis, from a theoretical point of view, some
models of PTSD and psychosis appear to converge on their proposition regarding the
basis and development of involuntary intrusions. Specifically, recent cognitive theories
of PTSD (Brewin, Dalgleish & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000) view intrusions as
due to the representational format of trauma memories which lack spatial and temporal
context: "the trauma memory is poorly elaborated and inadequately integrated into its
context in time, place, subsequent and previous information and other autobiographical
memories" (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; p. 325). It is argued that poor contextual integration
leaves an individual vulnerable to the involuntary activation of trauma-related memories
in response to situational reminders of the trauma (e.g. sights, sounds, smells). Brewin et
al. (1996) refer to this process as reflecting the operation of a "situationally accessible
memory" (SAM) system.
On the other hand, Hemsley's (1996) cognitive model of schizophrenia proposes that
individuals with psychosis exhibit a weakened ability to integrate information within a
temporal and spatial context, which results in the occurrence of hallucinations and
delusions. This deficit is deemed to be generally present in individuals with psychosis,
although it may be exacerbated by the experience of trauma.
Some recent evidence in support of this information-processing view of the development
of PTSD intrusions and psychotic symptoms exists. Specifically, temporal and
contextual deficits have been found in individuals with psychosis, schizotypal
personality disorder, and individuals scoring high on schizotypy (i.e. psychosis
proneness) (Barch, Mitropoulou, Harvey, New, Silverman & Siever, 2004; Elvevag,
Brown, McCormack, Vousden & Goldberg, 2004; Peters, Nunn, Pickering & Hemsley,
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2002; Steel, Hemsley & Pickering, 2002). Additionally, high schizotypy, dissociation,
and experimental manipulation that facilitates encoding into the SAM system have been
found to significantly predict the increase of traumatic intrusions in healthy individuals
following the viewing of a trauma film (Holmes, Brewin & Hennessy, 2004; Holmes &
Steel, 2004).
These observations raise important questions about the way the appraisal of traumatic
life events, dissociative processes and the representational format of trauma memories
may contribute to the development and maintenance of psychotic symptoms.
Dissociative processes, in particular, have been invoked for their potential to interfere
with the encoding of trauma-related information, and for their possible mediating role in
the relationship between trauma and PTSD and psychotic symptomatology (e.g. Allen,
Coyne & Console, 1997; Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Morrison et al., 2003; van der Kolk
et ah, 1996).
From a cognitive perspective, dissociation has been conceptualised as a disruption and
separation in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, identity, perception of
the environment and memory (e.g. American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Siegel,
1996). However, despite its clinical importance, the cognitive underpinnings of
dissociation are not well understood.
Several studies have used various experimental tasks (e.g. emotional Stroop, directed
forgetting task, free recall, recognition) in order to examine the role of attention and
conscious and unconscious memory during dissociative experiences (e.g. DePrince &
Freyd, 1999; Elzinga, Phaf, Ardon & van Dyck, 2003; McNally, Clancy & Schacter,
9
2001; Zoellner, Sacks & Foa, 2003), however, conflicting results have been reported.
For instance, Zoellner et al. (2003) have found no evidence of an avoidant or an
intrusive encoding style for trauma-related material in PTSD clients even after the use of
a "dissociation" mood induction procedure; whereas, DePrince and Freyd (2001) have
reported that healthy participants with high scores of dissociation tend to recall fewer
trauma and more neutral words when the experimental task involves divided attention,
highlighting the potentially important role played by the attentional context during
dissociative processes (a more comprehensive review of relevant studies is reported in
Chapter 3, Section 3. 2.).
Inconsistencies in results appear to be due mainly to different population samples being
studied (e.g. undergraduate students, individuals with PTSD, dissociative identity
disorder (DID), history of abuse), and different methodologies being employed.
To date, and to the best of our knowledge, no study has experimentally investigated
dissociative phenomena in individuals with a history of psychosis. Additionally, no
study has included tests of attention and memory (implicit and explicit) in a single
experiment that is methodologically sound. Therefore, no conclusions can be drawn with
regards to the cognitive mechanisms of dissociation and their potential impact on the
alteration of attentional and memory functioning for trauma-related information, which
could be explained in terms of attention deficit/avoidance, disrupted encoding, or
retrieval inhibition. Furthermore, no firm deductions can be made about the possible role
of dissociation in the vulnerability, onset and maintenance of psychotic (as well as other)
disorders.
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In this context, the research project described in this thesis had a twofold purpose. The
first aim was to investigate the pathway of trauma-related information processing in
individuals who had experienced at least one psychotic episode, who presented with
residual symptoms, and who were consequently hypothesised to be prone to
dissociation, in comparison with a healthy control group. This would allow us to
examine experimentally some of the cognitive processes underlying the hypothesis
introduced above that dissociation, occurring as a result of trauma, might render
individuals vulnerable to experiencing repeated psychotic episodes (e.g. Allen et al.,
1997).
To this aim, two experimental tasks were used to evaluate the involvement of attentional
and mnemonic processes occurring, as hypothesised, during dissociative phenomena.
The first task was an Emotional Stroop Task merged with a Directed Forgetting Task
(list method), performed under conditions of divided attention. Stimuli included trauma-
related, positive and categorised neutral words. Following the study phase, by applying
the process dissociation procedure (PDP; Jacoby, 1991) to a subsequently administered
Word-Stem Completion Task, we were able to measure the relative contribution to
dissociation of implicit and explicit memory for trauma-related compared to positive and
neutral information.
According to the literature reviewed thus far, we expected to find a disruption in
information processing specific to trauma-related material, which would be manifest in
an attentional bias and, most importantly, impaired explicit (but not implicit) memory
performance. The preservation of implicit memory, typically observed in dissociative
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disorders (e.g. Kihlstrom, 2001), would indicate the presence of trauma-related material
which is beyond conscious control and that might render an individual vulnerable to
traumatic/psychotic intrusions due to its involuntary activation in response to situational
triggers (i.e. word-stems, in our case).
Although we recognise the presence of a cumulative effect in terms of the contribution
of distal and proximal traumatic life events to an individual's propensity to dissociate
and his/her vulnerability to psychopathology, in this thesis we focused on examining the
potential increased vulnerability brought about by more recent distressing experiences.
Explicitly, in line with the view outlined above (e.g. McGorry et al., 1991; Shaw et al.,
2002), we adopted the stance that the experience of psychosis is in itself a traumatic life
event which is likely to cause trauma-related symptoms and that requires an individual
to adapt and make major readjustments in relation to his/her life roles and goals.
Consequently, the second objective of this thesis was to explore the relationship amongst
severity of symptomatology, current levels of the psychological impact of trauma (i.e.
experience of psychosis), dissociation, and recovery style - i.e. integration vs. sealing
over (e.g. McGlashan, 1987) - in our clinical sample by using self-report questionnaires,
and also to evaluate their relative influence on the participants' performance in the
experimental tasks.
However, before we begin to report on the empirical work carried out, we shall dedicate
the remaining part of this chapter to the introduction of the main clinical aspects and
psychological theories of psychosis. Then, in Chapter 2, we shall present some of the
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current issues related to the concepts of trauma, dissociative phenomena, and examine
the relationship between trauma and dissociation and their particular relevance to
psychosis.
1. 2. Psychosis: definition and clinical aspects.
The term psychosis is conventionally used to describe the most severe psychiatric
disorders. Traditionally, a distinction has been made between psychosis and neurosis,
whereby psychosis has been understood as a condition with organic aetiology in which
the individual affected is thought to have lost touch with the objective reality, whereas
neurosis has been seen as a condition with psychological aetiology in which contact with
reality is preserved (e.g. Beer, 1996). Additionally, since for most psychiatric disorders
there is a lack of clear biological correlates, two different types of psychotic disorders
have been proposed: organic psychoses, for which the origin of symptoms can be
identified as due to organic damage in specific brain loci, and functional psychoses, for
which an obvious cause is unknown but it is assumed to be organic, in whole or in part.
Therefore, traditional approaches to diagnostic classifications of mental health problems
assume a hierarchical structure with varying degrees of supposed brain dysfunction:
organic psychoses, functional psychoses, and neurotic disorders at the end of the
hierarchy, since they are assumed to be largely non-organic in their aetiology. This
traditional view changed somewhat with the publication of the DSM-III (American
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Psychiatric Association, 1980), which abandoned the major categorical distinction
between psychosis and neurosis.
To date, functional psychoses have been conventionally divided into non-affective (e.g.
schizophrenia) and affective psychoses to indicate the absence or presence respectively
of a characteristic emotional tone of the symptoms presented (e.g. depression, mania).
Since the 1960s, when research into the effects of different social environments in
psychiatric institutions was carried out (e.g. Wing & Brown, 1961), it has become
conventional to separate symptoms of schizophrenia into two syndromes signifying
functional distortions or excesses {positive) and deficits {negative). Positive symptoms
include:
delusions', erroneous beliefs held in spite of evidence to the contrary, that are not
accepted by other members of the individual's culture (or subculture);
hallucinations', sensory experiences in the absence of any stimulation from the
environment;
thought disorder, problems in the organisation of ideas and speech;
disorganised behaviour, difficulties in self-monitoring, bizarre or catatonic
behaviour;
whereas, negative symptoms include:
apathy or avolition: lack of interest in initiating goal-directed behaviour;
alogia: poverty of content and reduced speech;
blunted affect', restrictions in the range and intensity of emotional expression;
withdrawal', social and emotional.
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This set of symptoms has been incorporated into current diagnostic classification
systems, and the presence of positive symptoms in particular has become for most
clinicians a strong indicator that an individual is suffering from a psychotic episode and
should be given a related diagnosis (e.g. schizophrenia) despite this not carrying
necessarily any particular theoretical or prognostic value.
In fact, notwithstanding the identification of the above symptoms, there is evidence that
psychosis exists on a continuum with normal and qualitatively similar experiences that
occur in the general population (e.g. Kendler, Gallagher, Abelson & Kessler, 1996;
Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam & van Os, 2003). For example, van Os, Hanssen, Bijl &
Ravelli (2000) found that 17.5% of a random sample of 7076 individuals reported
having experienced psychotic-like symptoms (i.e. high schizotypy, or psychosis
proneness) and could be placed on a continuum between the non-clinical and clinical
populations with 2% of these receiving a formal diagnosis of non-affective psychosis.
Moreover, it is well known that in conditions of extreme sensory deprivation (Leff,
1968), solitary confinement (Grassian, 1983), sleep deprivation (Babkoff, Sing, Thome,
Genser & Hegge, 1989), bereavement (Grimby, 1993) and hostage situations (Siegel,
1984) individuals can also experience hallucinations and delusions.
Therefore it would appear that a view of psychosis as continuous with manifestations
ranging from psychotic-like experiences to psychotic disorders may be preferable to a
model of discontinuity between normal and abnormal. It is more likely that, as it is the
case with "neurotic disorders", clinical levels are reached once symptoms interfere
significantly with the individual's biopsychosocial functioning.
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The definition of particular criteria that might characterise the passage from normal to
abnormal ranges of psychotic experiences has undergone several developments over the
last fifty years, and today the DSM-IV-TR (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental
Disorders - Fourth Edition - Text Revision; American Psychiatric Association, 2000),
and the ICD-10 (International Classification of Diseases - Tenth Edition; World Health
Organization, 1992) are the most widely used diagnostic classification systems ofmental
disorders. They are both categorical in their classification and provide equivalent,
although not identical, lists of symptoms grouped into separate types (or sub-types) of
psychotic disorders. Table 1. 1. below, gives an outline of the types of psychotic
disorders reported in DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10.









Psychotic disorder due to a medical condition






Acute and transient psychotic disorders
Induced delusional disorders
Other non-organic psychotic disorders
Unspecified non-organic psychosis
Both these systems provide inclusion and exclusion criteria for diagnosing schizophrenia
and other psychotic disorders. However, the proposed diagnostic concepts are to be
regarded as provisional constructs (purely describing observable phenomenology)
intended to foster the need for international communication and research on psychosis,
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rather than categories reflecting any correspondence with specific underlying processes
or aetiology.
A recent review of epidemiological studies (Jablensky, 2003) cites an overall worldwide
prevalence of schizophrenia in the range of 1.4-4.6 per 1000 population at risk, whereas
the incidence rate ranges from 0.17 to 0.54 per 1000 population per year. The typical age
of onset is between late adolescence and mid 20s for males and late 20s to early 30s for
females, although for the latter group there seems to be another increase in incidence
after the age of 40, when the male-female ratio becomes inverted.
Different hypotheses have been put forward to try and explain the reasons for these
gender differences. These have varied from the supposed protective effect of oestrogen
in reducing the sensitivity of D2 dopamine receptors (Hafner, an der Heiden, Behrens,
Gattaz, Hambrecht, Loftier, Maurer, Munk-Jorgensen, Nowotny, Riecher-Kossler &
Stein, 1998), to gender differences in premorbid levels of psychosocial functioning, with
males showing a significantly higher frequency of socially adverse behaviour (e.g.
alcohol and drug abuse, aggressive behaviour, self-neglect) and lower social
adaptiveness at the early stages of illness than their females counterparts (Hafner,
Maurer, Loftier, an der Heiden, Hambrecht & Schultze-Lutter, 2003).
Although after the age of 50 there are relatively few new cases of schizophrenia in either
gender, late onset schizophrenia appears to be more common in females with a
preponderance ranging from 66 to 91% (Howard & Jeste, 2003).
Since late onset schizophrenia appears to be characterised by a relative lack of thought
disorder, fewer negative symptoms, and generally a more favourable course, it has been
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hypothesised that the disorder represents a neurodegenerative process as opposed to a
neurodevelopmental one in early onset (e.g. Tune & Salzman, 2003). Consequently, an
early emergence of schizophrenia might be accompanied by a worse prognosis because
of the adverse effect on the biological and psychosocial development in young people,
whereas, individuals with late onset may already have acquired more adaptive skills
when their illness strikes.
Most of the course and outcome studies of schizophrenia suggest that the course is
variable and indicate a number of factors associated with a better outcome such as, good
premorbid adjustment, acute and late onset, female gender, good insight, higher
socioeconomic status, ethnicity (i.e. white), geographical region (i.e. developing country
or rural setting), no family history of psychosis, level of expressed emotion (EE) within
the family (i.e. low frequency of hostility, critical comments and emotional over-
involvement) adherence to antipsychotic medication, good level of inter-episode
functioning with minimal residual symptoms, early intervention (e.g. Zuckerman, 1999).
Given the large heterogeneity in presentation of individuals with psychosis in terms of
different symptom profiles, age and type of onset (acute vs. insidious), variable response
to available treatments, unpredictable clinical course, and lack of a relationship between
diagnoses and aetiology, the validity of the classification systems outlined above have
been seriously questioned (e.g. Bentall, 2003). Both the DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10, while
providing the basis for effective communication among professionals, appear to create a
false impression of the existence of discrete taxonomic entities, by imposing a
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categorical framework and complex arbitrary algorithms on what are in fact overlapping
phenomena. Doubts about the stability and reliability of the proposed diagnostic
categories have also been raised (e.g. Arndt, Andreasen, Flaum, Miller & Nopoulos,
1995; Chen, Swann & Burt, 1996; Fenton & McGlashan, 1991) and despite any efforts
in improving reliability, this in itself does not guarantee better construct validity.
Another fundamental problem with the current diagnostic systems regards the basic
dichotomising of affective and non-affective psychoses. A diagnosis of psychosis
normally takes precedence over other types of disorders, however, in most cases
emotional disturbance (anxiety and depression in particular) precede, accompany, and
follow a psychotic episode (e.g. Birchwood, 2003; Freeman & Garety, 2003). Kendler et
al. (1996) found that individuals with non-affective psychoses had a lifetime prevalence
of 73.4% for mood disorders and of 71.4% for anxiety disorders. As a result, the
"paradox" of experience of emotions in non-affective psychoses, an issue neglected for a
long time, is recently becoming the focus of attention for some researchers (e.g.
Blanchard, Mueser & Bellack, 1998; Myin-Germeys, Delespaul & deVries, 2000). For
instance, a recent study that looked at the experience of basic emotions in individuals
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia with and without affective symptoms found that all
patients tended to feel negative emotions such as fear, disgust, guilt, shame and anger
more often than a healthy control group, but also that only patients with affective
symptoms felt the positive emotions of joy and interest less often than controls;
however, there was no significant difference between this latter group and patients
without affective negative symptoms, which shows a full range (positive and negative)
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of emotional experience in individuals with a diagnosis of chronic schizophrenia
(Suslow, Roestel, Ohrmann & Arolt, 2003). In terms of the diagnostic value of the
DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10 categories of affective and non-affective psychosis, some
evidence exists that a high rate of affective symptoms is equally common in patients
with either diagnosis, showing that the overlap between the two syndromes is the rule
rather than the exception (van Os, Gilvarry, Bale, van Horn, Tattan, White & Murray,
2000). Of course, both classification systems have attempted to overcome this impasse
by incorporating schizophrenia and affective disorders into the "intermediate" category
of schizoaffective disorder.
A related question is the distinction between schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. The
latter is described in DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10 as a disorder characterised by a pattern of
recurrent affective episodes which include depressive and manic phases with intervening
euthymic periods. However, despite this classic conceptualisation of bipolar disorder,
many patients do not return to "baseline function" in between episodes and, during a
psychotic episode, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder may be indistinguishable from
each other, which alerts us of the possibility that the two may not be separate disorders
(e.g. Adler & Strakowski, 2003, Bentall & Kinderman, 1999).
A different way of addressing this issue, rather than resorting to mixed categories, has
been that of adopting a dimensional approach. Dimensional models attempt to define
groups of symptoms that tend to co-occur through statistical techniques such as factor
analysis. The resulting identified dimensions may then overlap within the same
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individual who can also move along them over time. Several investigators (e.g. Grube,
Bilder, Goldman, 1998; Ratakonda, Gorman, Yale & Amador, 1998) have identified
three main independent dimensions underlying psychotic disorders: a) reality distortion
syndrome (i.e. florid delusions and hallucinations), b) psychomotor poverty syndrome
(i.e. poverty of speech, blunted affect, apathy/avolition, anhedonia, social withdrawal,
decreased sponteneity), and c) disorganisation syndrome (i.e. attentional impairment,
thought disorder, bizarre behaviour, inappropriate affect). However, other studies have
isolated slightly different and interrelated dimensions such as positive, negative and
depressive symptoms (Stefanis, Hanssen, Smirnis, Avramopoulos, Evdokimidis,
Stefanis, Verdoux & van Os, 2002), have found a different number of dimensions (e.g.
Cuesta & Peralta, 2001), or have used a hierarchical approach (Serretti, Rietschel,
Lattuada, Krauss, Schulze, Muller, Maier & Smeraldi, 2001) in an attempt to reconcile
categorical and dimensional models of psychopathology.
Therefore, while current diagnostic categories appear to lack in validity and reliability,
properties that are required for use both in research and in clinical practice, dimensional
approaches seem to provide more flexibility in the description of psychotic phenomena
in terms ofwhich symptom dimensions are present and their degree of severity.
We shall now turn to examine how the presence of psychotic phenomena has been
explained by theorists belonging to different schools of thought. Although it is beyond
the remit of this thesis to provide a comprehensive review of every theory of psychosis,
at this point it is useful to introduce briefly some of the most influential psychological
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accounts of psychotic disorders that are of particular relevance for our study.
Specifically, a general overview of the neuropsychological, cognitive and
psychodynamic approaches will now be considered in turn, since they will aid our
understanding of psychotic phenomena as a composite of the disruption/distortion of
cognitive processes and defence mechanisms. Finally, a summary of this chapter will be
given.
1.3. Theoretical approaches to psychotic disorders.
1.3. 1. Neuropsychological perspective.
Neuropsychological models integrate neurological and cognitive explanations of
psychosis. Such models are based on the assumption that the brain works somewhat like
a computer in the way it processes information, by a number of modular processes
working in parallel (e.g. Shallice, 1988). Generally, these models attempt to provide an
understanding of how cognitive impairment, based on possible neurological damage,
gives rise to psychotic experiences. Research has shown a number of cognitive
neuropsychological deficits in people with psychosis. For example, people who meet
diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia appear to function with IQs which are on average
10 points lower than premorbid IQ estimates (Nelson, Pantelis, Barnes, Thraser &
Bodger, 1994). In terms of more specific cognitive deficits, individuals with
schizophrenia have shown to have attentional problems (e.g. slower reaction times,
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difficulty maintaining vigilance), episodic and working memory difficulties, and deficits
in executive function irrespective of IQ scores (e.g. Aleman, Hijman, de Haan & Kahn,
1999; Goldberg, David & Gold, 2003; Weickert, Goldberg, Gold, Bigelow, Egan &
Weinberger, 2000).
Several models have emerged that have tried to interpret neurocognitive deficits in a
unitary fashion so as to identify a single deficit that might underpin symptoms of
schizophrenia. A recent model suggests that the fundamental deficit in schizophrenia is a
disruption of the fluid co-ordination of mental activity, referred to as cognitive dysmetria
(Andreasen, 1999). The disruption in the synchrony of mental activity would manifest
itself in difficulties in behaviour, cognition and emotion. Essentially, schizophrenia is
seen as a neurodevelopmental cognitive disorder with a complex aetiology (interaction
of genetics and environment) that results in abnormalities of brain development. These
abnormalities (from conception to early adulthood) lead to the disruption of anatomic
and functional connectivity in the brain which causes cognitive dysmetria and,
consequently, positive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia. A similar
neurodevelopmental model has been proposed also by Weinberger (1987; Weinberger &
Marenco, 2003).
Frith (1987; 1992) proposed that underlying the symptoms of schizophrenia is a disorder
of consciousness or self-awareness. It is argued that for people with schizophrenia,
preconscious processes (e.g. the selection of the appropriate interpretation and response
to stimuli) are frequently conscious, so that, for example auditory hallucinations are seen
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as an awareness of incorrect preconscious interpretations of stimuli. Such a disorder
impairs an individual's ability to think using metarepresentations or metacognitions (i.e.
higher order abstract concepts) and causes three types of disorders characteristic of
schizophrenia: a) willed intention, or the inability to generate spontaneous or willed
actions, which results in inappropriate or poverty of action; b) self-monitoring, or
inability to monitor willed intentions, which results in auditory hallucinations, delusions
of control or thought insertion; c) monitoring the intentions ofothers, or the inability to
understand the meaning of social situations, which results in paranoid delusions. Frith
(1992) suggests that dysfunctions in the neuronal pathways between the
septohippocampal system and the prefrontal cortex, as well as dopamine dysregulation
in these areas of the brain, may be implicated in the disruption of consciousness.
An alternative but similar model has been proposed by Hemsley (1987; 1996).
According to this model, individuals with schizophrenia exhibit a weakened influence of
spatial and temporal regularities of past experience on the processing of current
perception. In particular, it is argued that there is a disturbance of the moment by
moment integration of stored memories with current sensory input, which results in
information not being integrated within a temporal and spatial context.
Consequently, in schizophrenia an individual's experience of the sensory environment is
affected by impairment in the rapid and automatic assessment of its significance. In
other words, non-relevant features of the social environment are experienced as
personally relevant, and thoughts and memories which are irrelevant to ongoing tasks
are nonetheless assessed and perceived as alien and attributed to an external source. This
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dysfunction in monitoring processes can therefore lead to individuals experiencing
symptoms such as hallucinations and delusional ideas of reference. Some empirical
support for this overly rapid assessment in individuals with schizophrenia comes from a
study on probabilistic reasoning that found a tendency in this group to jump to firmly
held conclusions on the basis of little evidence (Garety, Hemsley & Wessely, 1991).
Again, deregulation of dopamine in the septohippocampal neuronal pathways has been
proposed as the source of the deficit (Gray, Feldon, Rawlins, Hemsley & Smith, 1990).
Other deficits in information processing, particularly attention (Braff, 1993) and
working memory (Goldman-Rakic, 1994), have been pointed out as being the cause of
symptomatology in patients with schizophrenia. Hence, individuals affected by the
disorder would have difficulties in focusing their attention (i.e. inhibiting it from
irrelevant stimuli and allocating it to relevant tasks) thus feeling overwhelmed, and in
organising their thoughts and behaviours as a result of an impaired memory system; both
types of dysfunctions are regarded as being possibly due to disrupted prefrontal cortex
circuitries.
All of these neuropsychological models appear to elevate one particular cognitive deficit
and deem it to be fundamentally responsible for more extensive deficits in information
processing and the resulting manifestation of several psychotic symptoms. Thus,
different "essential" cognitive deficits have been put forward and corresponding
neurological pathways have been proposed as the "solid" basis for these hypothetical
models, most of which await empirical verification.
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A different approach to the rather reductionistic "one explains it all" method, has been
that of studying specific psychotic symptoms (e.g. Costello, 1993). This symptom-based
approach is recognised as being the most useful and promising in terms of advancement
of knowledge given the heterogeneity of psychotic manifestations. This type of
investigation has led to the development of functional cognitive models of psychotic
symptoms, reviewed next.
1. 3. 2. Cognitive perspective.
Cognitive models of psychosis are based on the assumption that psychotic symptoms do
not necessarily form a syndrome which reflects the presence of an underlying disorder;
rather, they offer discrete explanations and therapeutic approaches for individual
symptoms which are seen as being on a continuum with normal experiences (e.g.
Haddock & Slade, 1996). During the last 20 years or so, most of the advances have
taken place in the development of models of positive symptoms, delusions and
hallucinations in particular.
Maher (1988) suggested that delusions are simply the result of normal explanations of
anomalous experiences. Once formed, delusional beliefs are then maintained by normal
cognitive processes such as "self-fulfilling prophecy" (i.e. things turning out just as one
expected because one behaves in a manner that optimises those very outcomes) and the
experience of relief from puzzlement. Although this model provides a plausible
explanation of beliefs formation and maintenance when anomalous experiences occur, it
does not take into account vulnerability factors (i.e. why should individuals have
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abnormal experiences in the first place) and the role of reasoning and emotional biases
(e.g. Garety et al., 1991; Kaney & Bentall, 1992).
Another early model (Bannister, 1983) proposed that delusions can be seen as metaphors
reflecting the rational description of bizarre or confusing experiences, and that as such,
themes could be identified revealing an individual's underlying difficulties and
concerns. While Bannister (1983) argued that the reason for using unsignalled
metaphors might be that the person is distrustful of others and prefers to hide his/her real
troubling thoughts and feelings, others have argued that the presence of cognitive
deficits would interfere with an individual's capacity to form clear ideas and thoughts,
which might result in communication based on what would appear to be unsignalled
metaphors (Fowler, Garety & Kuipers, 1995).
More recently, Garety and Hemsley (1994) have examined the role of reasoning biases
in the formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs. The authors have found evidence
of two apparently contradictory biases in deluded individuals: a tendency to make less
use of past learned regularities accompanied by excessive reliance on current
information, and a tendency to rely excessively on prior expectations when processing
new information. These two judgement styles have been proposed as reflecting two
sequential stages in their model of delusions: formation and maintenance respectively.
The authors have suggested that excessive reliance on current information leads to the
formation of delusions; these then generate strong expectations and are maintained by a
bias towards belief congruent information.
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Research on attributional processes in individuals with delusions has led some
investigators to propose that persecutory delusions have a defensive function (e.g.
Bentall, 1994; Kinderman & Bentall, 1997; Lyon, Kaney & Bentall, 1994). These
authors have found that individuals with persecutory delusions tend to attribute positive
events to internal and negative events to external causes (other people rather than
situations). They also show a specific attentional bias for threatening information and
information relevant to the self-concept. Bentall and colleagues have suggested that
deluded individuals have a negative self-schema and low self-esteem which are
experienced as a discrepancy between the individual's ideal and actual selves.
Consequently, delusions have a defensive function for these individuals who have an
externalising bias for negative events in order to prevent thoughts and feelings about
their low-self esteem reaching consciousness.
Trower and Chadwick (1995) have placed this conceptualisation of persecutory
delusions as compensatory beliefs more explicitly within an interpersonal context
suggesting that the source of threat to the self is an interpersonal negative evaluation.
They have also extended this model to include punishment paranoia, characterised by
the opposite attributional style (i.e. individuals attribute positive events to external and
negative events to internal causes). However, since in punishment paranoia the
individual believes that they are blameworthy and deserve punishing by others, its
defensive function is less clear than in persecutory paranoia.
Attributional approaches to motivation and emotion (Weiner, 1986) have also been used
to conceptualise hallucinations (auditory in particular) as a tendency to misattribute
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internal events (e.g. one's own thoughts) to an external source (Bentall, 1990). This
cognitive model of hallucinations is based on evidence from early studies that have
shown the co-occurrence of auditory hallucinations with sub-vocalisations or
movements of the speech musculature (Gould, 1950), and that have found that the
occurrence of hallucinations can be inhibited by giving individuals verbal tasks that
block sub-vocalisations (Margo, Hemsley & Slade, 1981). Bentall (1990) has argued
that this attributional bias may be influenced by the presence of stress induced arousal,
by the individual's beliefs and expectations about the self, the world and the future, and
by the negative reinforcement (i.e. reduction of anxiety) that the process of
misattribution will generate (i.e. avoidance of an aversive cognitive event: negative
thoughts about the self).
A similar account has been given by Morrison, Haddock and Tarrier (1995). The authors
have argued that auditory hallucinations arise from an individual's misattribution of ego-
dystonic (i.e. incompatible with one's beliefs) thoughts to an external source. The
presence of this process would explain both negative and positive auditory
hallucinations in individuals with respectively positive and negative self-schema, in that
it would reduce cognitive dissonance and distress. Indeed, the emotional valence of the
auditory hallucinations has been found to have a direct effect on the bias in source
monitoring (Morrison & Haddock, 1997), and on individuals' emotional and behavioural
responses. Specifically, voices which were believed to be malevolent elicited negative
affect and were resisted; whereas, voices believed to be benevolent were associated with
positive affect and were engaged with (Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994; 1995). More
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recently, Morrison (1998) has suggested some parallels between panic disorder and
hallucinations and has argued that misinterpretations of auditory hallucinations are
maintained by safety seeking behaviours, including hypervigilance. High levels of
anxiety would also explain the misinterpretation of ambiguous external stimuli (e.g.
noises or conversations in the next room) as threatening auditory hallucinations (e.g.
Fowler & Morley, 1989; Haddock, Bentall & Slade, 1993).
The cognitive models reviewed above attempt an analysis of different ways in which
people with psychosis might strive to make sense of adverse and unusual experiences.
While this endeavour is useful in providing clues about the nature and the function of
some types of hallucinations and delusional beliefs, and therapeutic working models for
psychosis, their explanatory power appears to be somewhat limited to current possible
precipitating and maintaining factors of the disorder. As such, these models lack the
necessary emphasis on important developmental factors (e.g. early relationships, role
transitions), which would add considerably to our understanding of psychotic symptoms.
Further potential developmental contributory causes of psychosis are briefly reviewed
next.
1. 3. 3. Psychodynamic perspective.
Psychodynamic theories of psychosis emerged with Freud's (1894/1962) proposal that
the same basis for neurotic disorders (i.e. intra-psychic conflicts and defence
mechanisms) also applied to psychosis. Despite his initial unitary approach, Freud
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(1940/1964) gradually came to believe that because of the unique nature of psychosis,
individuals were unable to establish the close interpersonal relationship essential for
analytic work (i.e. form a transference relationship with the analyst). However, other
psychoanalysts such as Fromm-Reichmann (1950) and Sullivan (1962) disagreed with
this view and went on to adapt treatment techniques in order to be able to remain
therapeutically engaged with people with psychosis. They suggested that the psychotic
Ego is fragile and unable to deal with the stress of interpersonal challenges other than
regressing to early childhood forms of communication. Hence, the aim of therapy was
for the patients to gain insight into the role that the past had played in their current
difficulties and to gradually learn adult forms of communication. In his historical review
of the development of psychoanalytic ideas about psychosis, Frosh (1983) proposed that,
ultimately, psychosis results from the loss of the capacity to test reality, the process of
which hinges on adverse childhood experiences.
Several theorists (e.g. Bion, 1962; Klein, 1946/1986; Kohut, 1977; Winnicott, 1960)
have contributed to the development of psychodynamic concepts on psychosis. In a
nutshell, inadequacies in the interactions between a baby and its main caregiver (e.g.
poor parenting, trauma), may lead to the development of a vulnerable Ego in the form of
insecure sense of identity, poor self-esteem, insecure boundaries between self and
others, and difficulties in relating to others. If a fragile sense of self is threatened by
adverse life events, the individual will respond by activating an immature pattern of
defence mechanisms characteristic of early childhood such as, splitting, projection,
denial and distortion. Thus, for instance, at times of emotional difficulty, a vulnerable
31
self is likely to "split off' unbearable negative emotions and project them into the
external world (e.g. somebody else), which will then become the source of "badness" or
persecution. This defence will have the function of protecting the Ego from underlying
negative feelings (e.g. anxiety, low self-esteem). Consequently, psychosis is seen as the
result of the vulnerability of the Ego coupled with the vulnerability to early defence
processes, which distort and impair the individual's perception and reality testing.
Psychodynamic theories also recognise the validity of genetic predisposition to
psychosis (e.g. Robbins, 1993), so that the vulnerability to immature defence
mechanisms is seen as the product of the interaction between genetic vulnerability and
the experience of poor parenting, which result in unfavourable developmental pathways.
As a whole, the psychodynamic approach offers a description of psychotic phenomena
based on clinical experience and derived from prolonged therapeutic relationships.
Moreover, it provides inferential ideas about unconscious functioning which are
analysed with psychotic patients using interpretation over time. Consequently, it can
contribute valuably to the understanding of personal vulnerabilities, the dynamic
mechanisms an individual resorts to when facing unbearable affects or cognitions, and
the supposedly disguised personal meaning or significance of psychotic phenomena (e.g.
unsignalled metaphors in delusional beliefs).
Although the validity and efficacy of psychodynamic treatments for psychosis has
received contrasting views (e.g. Hingley, 1997a; Mueser & Berenbaum, 1990), some of
the psychodynamic concepts have been supported by cognitive research. For example,
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the loss of the capacity to test reality has found parallels in the metacognition of reality
testing in hallucinations (Bentall, 1990), whereas, the concept of projection has been
substantiated by studies into the defensive function of persecutory delusions (e.g. Lyon
et al., 1994). Moreover, there appears to be a promising trend towards the integration
and further testing of valuable psychodynamic ideas such as defence mechanisms and
the nature of cognitive distortions during information processing (e.g. Hingley, 1997b), a
development within which the work reported in this thesis could also be suitably placed.
1. 4. Summary and integration.
In this Chapter, the main issues surrounding the relationship between trauma,
dissociation and psychosis have been introduced and an outline of the aims of this thesis
has been given. The methodology employed in the experimental investigation reported
in Chapter 3 draws from paradigms used in cognitive psychology, which have been duly
modified in order to address specific hypotheses. A review of the conceptualisation of
psychosis and psychotic disorders has been presented, and the main clinical aspects and
diagnostic classifications and limitations have been illustrated. Subsequently, the major
psychological theories of psychosis have been reported with a description and critical
evaluation of the key features for each of the approaches considered.
A common way of accommodating the disparity of findings and the multiplicity of
factors proposed by exponents of differing theoretical orientations is that of presenting
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some overarching, multifactorial model of psychosis, the most cited of which is
probably Zubin and Spring's (1977) stress-vulnerability model. This and other similar
models (e.g. Ciompi, 1988; Strauss & Carpenter, 1981) suggest that the development of
a disorder is the result of the presence of a necessary but not sufficient predisposition
(vulnerability or diathesis) for the disorder, and a similarly necessary but not sufficient
stressor which interacts with the diathesis. Although stress-vulnerability models may
appear very seducing in that they encompass all possible factors relevant to the aetiology
and maintenance of psychotic disorders, they may be somewhat misguided for at least
two reasons. Firstly, because of their overinclusive nature, they are able to incorporate
and account for disparate manifestations of psychotic experiences under the unique
umbrella of dubious diagnostic categories such as schizophrenia. Secondly, they seem to
assume that the vulnerability factors are essentially biological and that the stressors are
effectively environmental factors which increase the risk of symptoms emergence and
modulate the course of the disorder. When psychological vulnerability is taken into
account (e.g. cognitive deficits, cognitive distortions and misattributions), it seems to be
done in the context of underpinning biological vulnerability (e.g. genetic,
neurophysiological and/or neuroanatomical abnormalities), therefore giving the false
impression that biological vulnerability takes precedence as a fundamental and
necessary cause of psychosis.
An alternative way of adopting an integrative approach might be that of looking for
points of contact amongst the different theoretical stances. This would involve the
identification of conceptually related ideas and/or convergent evidence to be developed
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into further hypotheses and tested in a systematic fashion. Such an approach would
hopefully eliminate one further weakness of the stress-vulnerability models, that is, the
provision of a comfort area within which investigators can pursue separate research
programmes in isolation, with the danger of strengthening further the idea of
(seemingly) unrelated, yet all important, vulnerability and stress factors.
As emerged from the review outlined above, one point of convergence appears to be the
difficulty in reality testing identified by several investigators which affects people with
psychosis; a disturbance that seems to be crucial in the development and maintenance of
a range of psychotic symptoms, chiefly delusions and hallucinations (e.g. Bentall, 1990;
Frith, 1992; Frosh, 1983; Hemsley, 1996; Morrison, 1998). This identified common
ground provides us with the possibility of investigating the nature of some of the
psychological processes involved in the disturbance of reality testing, namely,
dissociation (as a hypothesised mechanism of defence from trauma and/or extreme
negative affect) and the cognitive processes (i.e. attention and memory) on which it
impinges.
As mentioned above, dissociation and its relationship with trauma and psychosis are




"Come, blessed peace, we once again implore,
and let our pains be less, or power more."
(Alexander Brome, "The Riddle ")
2. 1. Introduction.
In this Chapter we shall endeavour to articulate the two related concepts of
psychological trauma and dissociative phenomena. The experience of potentially
traumatic events in people's lives is quite common, with an estimated lifetime
prevalence ranging from approximately 40 to 70% in the general population (e.g. Elliott,
1997; Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes & Nelson, 1995) and, as mentioned previously
in Chapter 1, up to 98% in individuals with psychosis (e.g. Mueser et al., 1998). Also
dissociative experiences (e.g. absorption-imaginative involvement, depersonalisation,
emotional numbing) appear to be common (approximately 80% in the general
population), especially in traumatised populations (e.g. Kihlstrom, Glisky & Angiulo,
1994; Ray & Faith, 1995), to the extent that they have been deemed to be one of the
primary features of traumatic stress reactions (e.g. Foa, Riggs & Gershuny, 1995;
Herman, 1997). In this Chapter, we shall begin by introducing a broad evolutionary view
36
of trauma as a human stress response, in order to provide a theoretical context within
which the psychological processes of integration vs. sealing over can be understood as
basic adaptive vs. maladaptive reactions to the trauma of psychosis. Subsequently, we
will present some of the current psychological theories of post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) in order to consider a number of possible psychopathological processes
occurring following trauma. Finally, we shall progress to illustrate the nature and current
understanding of dissociation, particularly as a response to traumatic stress, and will
conclude by drawing attention to its relationship with trauma and psychosis.
2.2. An integrative view of trauma.
In addressing the concept of trauma, one of the basic issues to be considered is its
relationship with stress. A common sense model of their relationship is that trauma
could simply be regarded as an extreme form of stress. However, this linear model is
complicated by a number of factors. One of these is: how extreme must a stressful event
be in order to constitute a traumatic experience? The DSM-III (American Psychiatric
Association, 1980) officially recognised PTSD and distinguished trauma from stress by
defining it as an event that is out of the normal range of usual human experience.
However, this definition was deemed to be unsatisfactory for at least two reasons: a) as
mentioned above, traumatic events are quite common in the general population; b)
events are traumatic not because they are unusual and occur rarely, but rather because
they overwhelm an individual's ordinary abilities to adapt to life. Consequently, this
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conceptualisation of trauma was changed in DSM-IV (American Psychiatric
Association, 1994) and a traumatic experience was defined as "exposure to an extreme
traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual
or threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one's physical integrity; or
witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of
another person; or learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of
death or injury experienced by a family member or other close associate" and to which
an individual would respond with "intense fear, helplessness and horror" (p. 424).
Although this definition recognises that a traumatic event need not be unusual and
allows for an individual's subjective experience to be taken into account, it may also be
considered too narrow in that it does not concede that threats to the self may be
traumatic even if they do not involve bodily threats.
In line with this view, and in relation to the experience of psychosis, Jackson, Knott,
Skeate and Birchwood (2004) have recently argued that the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD
place too much emphasis on the facet of physical integrity at the expense of
psychological integrity. Additionally, people with psychosis may also perceive
themselves to be physically at risk due to paranoid delusions (e.g. persecutory),
hallucinations (e.g. auditory, visual), coercive interventions (e.g. medication, seclusion),
or from other psychotic individuals in a psychiatric ward. Therefore it is argued that both
physical and psychological threats to one's integrity may constitute "exposure to an
extreme traumatic stressor".
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From an evolutionary framework point of view, stress is a state of arousal that occurs in
response to environmental stressors and that leads to biopsychosocial changes which
may bring about negative and/or positive consequences for an individual's adaptation
and well-being (e.g. Christopher, 2004). In fact, stress appears to play a critical role not
only in the emergence of bio and psychopathology, but also in emotional and cognitive
development (e.g. Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2002; McEwen, 2002). The adaptive or
maladaptive nature of a particular stress response depends on a number of factors, but
chiefly, on an individual's relationship with his/her environment. According to
evolutionary psychology, most psychopathology derives from a dissonance or
discontinuity between the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness (EEA; a statistical
composite of the environment for which we are biologically best adapted) and the actual
environment (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997). When an individual feels stress as a result of
perceived threat or cognitive discontinuity, a stress response system is activated in an
attempt to escape or eliminate the source of stress. This will bring about changes in the
central nervous system that range from subtle modifications (e.g. necessary to learn a
new task) to more profound alterations of neural networks associated with emotional and
cognitive paradigm shifts (McFarlane, Yehuda & Clark, 2002). Therefore, a traumatic
stress response is an evolutionarily inherited response to extreme states of arousal which
would normally lead to some positive and adaptive effects called post-traumatic growth
(PTG), rather than PTSD, in the form of a more integrated sense of self and philosophy
of life, and closer relationships with others (e.g. Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema & Larson,
1998; Tedeschi, Park & Calhoun, 1996; 1998; Waysman, Schwarzwald & Solomon,
2001). This framework seems to be consistent with evidence that shows that only a
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proportion of individuals (approximately 5-55%) exposed to a potentially traumatic
event will go on to develop PTSD, depending on type of trauma and demographic group
(e.g. Breslau, Chilcoat, Kessler & Davis, 1999; Ehlers, Mayou & Bryant, 1998; Kessler
et al., 1995; Koenen, Stellman, Stellman & Sommer, 2003; Norris, 1992; Widom, 1999).
Nonetheless, in keeping with an evolutionary perspective, the hallmark symptoms of
PTSD such as cognitive re-experiencing of a traumatic event (e.g. intrusive memories),
arousal and hypervigilance, and protective behavioural/cognitive avoidance (including
amnesia, emotional numbing and dissociation) can also be viewed as the basis of PTG
and therefore as adaptive behaviours to extreme threats, which may become pathological
under certain biopsychosocial conditions. In this respect, Eberly, Harkness and Engdahl
(1991) have argued that hypervigilance towards the same or similar (via generalised
anxiety to associated stimuli) events assists an individual to avoid the re-experiencing of
a threat; emotional numbing and dissociation would allow an individual to distinguish
between emotional and cognitive responses, thus allowing for more accurate and
adaptive information processing; and cognitive re-experiencing enables an individual to
learn from the traumatic event he/she experienced and to develop alternative more
adaptive responses should similar events reoccur in future.
Related to this point, Christopher (2004) has hypothesised that the normal adaptive
response to trauma can be conceptualised as traumatic metalearning, that is the process
of shattering and reconstitution of metacognitive schema about the self, society and
nature in which learning normally takes place. Consequently, PTG is seen as the forming
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of new and more coherent cognitive schema, whereas, PTSD is seen as the result of a
failure to modulate the normal adaptive trauma response with a more coherent and
meaningful metaframework.
In this context, we shall define as traumatic an event that threatens one's physical and/or
psychological integrity (including the experience of psychosis), that challenges an
individual's fundamental beliefs about the self, others and/or the world, and that can not
be dealt with by means of one's usual range of coping abilities. The extent to which an
individual will perceive an event as being dissonant from his/her existing schema will
determine the level of adjustment required in order to accommodate it within a reviewed
more adaptive set of beliefs and coping skills. Such a stressor would normally result in
an individual's experience of a cluster of trauma-related symptoms (e.g. dissociation,
intrusive memories, hypervigilance, avoidance) and lead to either PTG and a more
integrated sense of self, or PTSD (PP-PTSD, in our case) and sealing over.
The evolutionary framework is appealing in allowing us to set the concept of trauma of
psychosis within a useful ecological context. Additionally, it is also valuable in
highlighting the normally adaptive nature of human traumatic stress reactions, and in
proposing common physiological, cognitive, behavioural and emotional processes of
adaptive and maladaptive responses. However, this biopsychosocial view is largely
grounded on studies of evolutionary biology geared towards the identification of
determinants of phylogenetic adaptation to stress. As such, it does not provide an in
depth understanding of some of the key psychological factors, such as risk and
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protective factors that may influence whether an individual will develop PTSD rather
than experience PTG, the mechanisms of maintenance of the disorder, and specific
cognitive and emotional processes involved. Therefore, we shall now focus our attention
on some of the most influential psychological theories of trauma and post-traumatic
stress.
2. 3. Psychological theories ofPTSD.
Given the high lifetime exposure to trauma and the usually devastating effects of
experiencing psychotic symptoms acutely (during an episode) and residually (in between
episodes), individuals with psychosis typically report a high degree of trauma-related
symptomatology and may develop PP-PTSD (e.g. Jackson et al., 2004; Shaw et al.,
2002).
Although several theoretical approaches exist that offer interesting insights into the
nature of trauma and psychological traumatic stress reactions, in this Section we shall
focus on cognitive theories of PTSD because they are probably the most fully developed
and offer the greatest explanatory and predictive power (e.g. Dalgleish, 1999; 2004). As
such, while not specifically developed to account for trauma-related symptoms in people
with psychosis, a review of empirically based models of PTSD should provide us with a
conception of key psychological processes implicated in the post-traumatic stress
responses of our client group, as well as part of the theoretical basis on which to develop
our hypotheses.
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In the main, cognitive theories of PTSD tend to share the following propositions: a)
individuals experience trauma with a set of pre-existing beliefs about themselves, the
world and the future; b) the experience of trauma provides highly salient information
that is incompatible with these pre-existing beliefs; c) unsuccessful attempts to
assimilate this new information with pre-existing models of the self and the world may
lead to pathological post-traumatic reactions (e.g. Brewin & Holmes, 2003); whereas, by
extension, successful information processing which results in adaptive changes of
existing models would produce PTG, as reviewed above. A similar view of trauma
processing as part of psychosis has been proposed by Morrison et al. (2003).
This general conceptualisation of the emergence of PTSD is reflected in Horowitz's
(1976; 1986; 1997) stress response theory. According to this theory, in response to a
stressful or traumatic event and in recognition of loss, individuals will experience an
initial emotional reaction in the form of crying out or shock. This is then followed by an
attempt to assimilate the new trauma information with pre-existing knowledge.
However, Horowitz argues that, at this point, most individuals will experience an
information overload in which memories, thoughts and images of the traumatic event
cannot be easily reconciled with prior beliefs. Consequently, two distinct processes are
thought to come into play: one that tends to promote the resolving of the traumatic
material by bringing it to mind, and a second one that mobilises psychological defence
mechanisms that tend to avoid, suppress and pace the extent to which traumatic
information comes into consciousness. Accordingly, individuals will oscillate between
intrusion and avoidance of the trauma memory, and failure to process its information
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and adjust previous models of the self, the world and the future will result in the
development of PTSD.
Another account of the long term adjustment after the experience of trauma is provided
by Janoff-Bulman's (1992) theory ofshattered assumptions. According to this view, the
most significant factors influencing an individual's response to trauma are certain basic
assumptions about the self and the world. Specifically, these include a positive view of
the self (e.g. worthy, competent, invulnerable), and a view of the world as benevolent,
comprehensible, predictable and meaningful. Janoff-Bulman (1992) argued that PTSD is
the result of these assumptions being shattered following the experience of a traumatic
event and difficulties in updating them by cognitively reappraising and refraining the
trauma.
Both these theories of PTSD could be thought of as cognitive-social frameworks, in that,
they emphasise the likely wide impact of trauma in an individual's life, the readjustment
he/she would need to make in order to integrate a traumatic experience into pre-existing
views of the self and others, the role of his/her interpersonal context in facilitating or
blocking this process, and the potential for PTG.
In contrast, information-processing theories focus on the (subjectively perceived as)
traumatic event itself, how trauma-related information is represented, and how it is
subsequently processed in the cognitive system. For instance, Foa, Steketee and
Rothbaum (1989) have proposed a fear network approach to PTSD. The central idea is
that traumatic events are represented in memory in the form of fear networks consisting
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of interconnections between different nodes that contain information about the stimuli
(both present and associated through conditioning), cognitive, emotional and
physiological reactions, and behavioural responses to the events. Since one's basic
assumptions of safety are typically overturned following trauma, causing the individual
to become hypervigilant, the information contained within a fear network can be easily
activated by triggering stimuli (e.g. reminders of the event) and reach consciousness
(e.g. intrusive thoughts/images), which may lead the person to avoid and suppress the
intrusions.
According to Foa and colleagues (1989), successful resolution of the trauma can only
occur by weakening the overly strong associations between the nodes of the fear
network and by integrating its information with the individual's existing memory
structures. However, in order to achieve this, the network needs to be activated (e.g. via
imaginal or in vivo exposure) and then modified by incorporating information that is
incompatible with it.
This original network theory has been developed further by Foa and Riggs (1993) and
Foa and Rothbaum (1998) in order to take into account beliefs present before, during
and after the trauma, and also to include the role of appraisal in PTSD. Specifically, the
authors argue that individuals with more rigid pre-trauma beliefs (either positive or
negative) are more vulnerable to develop PTSD, in that, extremely positive beliefs
would be contradicted and extremely negative beliefs would be confirmed by the
experience of a traumatic event. Moreover, attention is drawn to the individual's
negative appraisal of his/her responses during and after the trauma which might
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exacerbate and reinforce negative beliefs, such as the self as incompetent and the world
as dangerous.
The single level of representation of schema-based and associative network models of
PTSD (e.g. Foa et al., 1989; Horowitz, 1997; Janoff-Bulman, 1992) has been criticised
for being too simple and unable to capture the complexity of clinical (but also non¬
clinical) phenomena, such as emotionally laden vs. cold memories, or meaning that goes
beyond what can be expressed verbally (e.g. Dalgleish, 2004; Power & Dalgleish, 1997;
Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). In contrast, the dual representation theory ofPTSD (Brewin
et al., 1996) suggests that there are two distinct memory systems that operate in parallel
and that store information in two different representational formats. The first type is
called "verbally accessible memory" (VAM) and contains a narrative memory of (parts
of) events that have received conscious processing. These are placed within a personal
spatial-temporal autobiographical context and can be retrieved either automatically or
using deliberate, strategic processes. The emotions that accompany VAM memories
include "primary emotions" (experienced at the time of the event) and "secondary
emotions" (generated following retrospective appraisal of the event).
The second type of memory system is called "situationally accessible memory" (SAM)
and contains information obtained from a lower level perceptual processing of details of
an event which have not received conscious attention (e.g. sounds, sights, smells,
proprioceptive sensations). Since the SAM system does not use a verbal format,
information on these memories cannot be easily communicated to others and is difficult
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to control because we cannot regulate exposure to such stimuli. The emotions that
accompany SAM memories are only those experienced during the event (i.e. "primary").
According to Brewin et al. (1996), PTSD is a hybrid disorder and recovery depends on
the reduction of negative emotions present in the VAM system (i.e. resolution of
negative beliefs) and the management of SAM memories (i.e. flashbacks). This last
process would be achieved by re-encoding the SAM memories into the VAM format so
that they can acquire a spatial-temporal context, can be placed in the past, and any
reminders will trigger a retrieval competition which would end with the VAM system
exerting control over the SAM system and the individual's emotional response.
Consequently, unlike what the other theories reviewed above assert, the dual
representation theory proposes that traumatic memories do not need to be changed,
instead, recovery is seen as the result of the introduction of retrieval competition
between an old and a new, more controllable, memory of the trauma.
The latest major theoretical development concerning pathological reactions to trauma is
Ehlers and Clark's (2000) cognitive model of PTSD. This model tends to pull together
several of the concepts outlined above and is in many respects similar to the dual
representation theory just reviewed. The authors maintain that PTSD arises when
individuals perceive a sense of current threat due to the way they process traumatic
information. This threat can be either an external threat to safety or an internal threat to
the self and the person's future and it is the result of the individual's negative appraisal
of the event, including its consequences, and of the very nature of the traumatic memory
itself. More explicitly, Ehlers and Clark (2000) argue that pre-existing negative
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experiences and beliefs increase the probability that individuals will respond to trauma
in a way that highlights their inability to influence their fate, their vulnerability and
helplessness, termed "mental defeat". Moreover, similarly to Brewin et al.'s (1996)
proposition, it is suggested that trauma memories are poorly elaborated, lack spatial-
temporal context, are processed perceptually rather than conceptually (cf. Roediger &
McDermott, 1993), and are retrieved unintentionally. Finally, Ehlers and Clark (2000)
propose that maladaptive behavioural strategies and cognitive processing styles are the
core maintaining factors of PTSD.
It is apparent that there is a high degree of overlap among the cognitive theories of
PTSD reviewed above (see Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Dalgleish, 2004; Dalgleish &
Power, 2004 for in depth critical evaluations and recent developments). They underline
the importance of several factors (e.g. personal beliefs, negative appraisal, altered
memory functioning) that might render an individual more vulnerable to adopt
maladaptive responses to traumatic events and progress along a pathological pathway to
the development of PTSD. Later in this Chapter (Section 2. 5.) we shall see how these
concepts may apply to psychosis, how they may be usefully employed to make
predictions about the way individuals who have experienced one or more psychotic
episodes may process trauma-related information, and how they may help account for
different recovery styles adopted by individuals in the aftermath of a psychotic episode.
However, beforehand we shall spend some time trying to articulate a view of
dissociation, as this will constitute an important part of our investigation.
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2. 4. Dissociation and its relationship to trauma.
The conceptualisation of dissociative phenomena has been the subject of much
discussion and debate (e.g. Frankel, 1996; Kluft & Foote, 1999; Ross, 1996). Broadly,
dissociation has been defined as a separation of mental processes (e.g. thoughts,
perceptions, memories, emotions, identity) that are normally integrated and accessible to
conscious awareness (Spiegel & Cardena, 1991). This fragmentation or altered state of
consciousness is thought to lead to a compartmentalisation of experiences and other
psychological processes such as depersonalisation, derealisation, absorption, identity
confusion, amnesia, disengagement, and emotional numbing. Consequently, dissociation
has been conceptualised as a phenomenon that consists of a continuum of experiences
present to some degree in most individuals (e.g. Ross, Joshi & Currie, 1990).
In everyday life, dissociation has been invoked to explain why an individual is able to
conduct complex but routine activities (e.g. driving a car) whilst simultaneously
engaging in other less predictable activities (e.g. holding a conversation). However, at
the opposite end of the dimension, as found in clinical populations, dissociation can
become a problem and contribute to psychopathology, in that, rather than simply
involving the automaticity of over-leamed behaviour, dissociation relates to the
unintentionality of a process that leads to the inability to integrate the
compartimentalised aspects of a given experience within consciousness, even though an
individual may be willing to do so. Therefore, dissociation appears to disrupt two key
elements of consciousness: awareness and voluntary control (Kihlstrom, 1984).
Additionally, this conceptualisation of dissociation does not necessitate that the
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separated components of an experience be entirely independent of each other. In fact,
dissociated information or psychological processes, although unavailable to
consciousness, can nonetheless have an interfering or facilitating (e.g. priming) effect on
ongoing tasks.
An early model of dissociation that attempts to account for dissociative experiences is
Braun's (1988) BASK model. This model proposes that an individual can separate, or
dissociate, aspects (behaviour, affect, sensation, and knowledge) of a given experience
so that he/she may not be aware of one or more of these, which would lead to
dissociative experiences of varying degrees. Another attempt at explaining a wide range
of dissociative phenomena is van der Hart, van der Kolk and Boon's (1996) hierarchical
model. According to the authors, there are three levels of pathological dissociation: a)
primary dissociation, which entails an individual's fragmented processing of traumatic
events; b) secondary dissociation, which involves the individual perceiving a traumatic
event without experiencing its full emotional impact; and c) tertiary dissociation which
results in the development of separate identities. Both of these early models, however,
appear to be rather descriptive in their nature and lacking explanatory power. As such,
they are relatively tentative, do not propose specific mechanisms by which dissociative
processes may operate, and do not lend themselves to the generation of specific
predictions that may be empirically tested.
It has been pointed out that (pathological) dissociation appears to possess many of the
attributes normally assigned to the defence mechanism of repression (Frankel, 1990).
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However, other authors (Davies & Frawley, 1994; Singer & Sincoff, 1990) have tried to
differentiate the two by defining repression as an active process through which the ego
attains control over conflicting material which is pushed deep into the unconscious
where it cannot be accessed; whereas, dissociation is defined as a process by which
some aspects of an experience (typically traumatic) are "cordoned off' by severing their
connection with the other components of the experience (e.g. separating thoughts and
emotions), because they are too overwhelming to be processed and then repressed.
Additionally, dissociation is seen as a fluctuating state of consciousness, therefore,
dissociated material may also be only partially or alternately out of an individual's
awareness.
This view of dissociation has led a number of authors to note parallels with hypnosis,
which has been described as a state of controlled and structured dissociation (e.g. Butler,
Duran, Jasiukaitis, Koopman & Spiegel, 1996; Putman, 1991; Spiegel & Cardena, 1990;
1991). Indeed, Janet (1907) saw hypnosis and dissociation as being virtually
synonymous and, more recently, Bliss (1984) has argued that the primary mechanism of
dissociative identity disorder (DID) is an individual's spontaneous and unintentional
misuse of self-hypnosis.
Pierre Janet was the first to study dissociation systematically and saw it as a
psychological process with which individuals react to overwhelming trauma. He also
argued that the memories of a traumatic event, although out of an individual's
awareness, continued to affect his/her perception, mood and behaviour, and that in order
to adapt to trauma he/she would need to assimilate the event to existing experiences,
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whereas, continuing to dissociate would lead, over time, to the emergence of
psychopathology. In recent years, Janet's ideas on trauma and dissociation have been re¬
evaluated and integrated into contemporary models of dissociation and trauma (cf. also
Section 2. 3., above). For instance, Putnam (1993) has proposed a number of protective
functions of dissociation: a) automatisation of certain behaviours; b) resolution of
irreconcilable conflicts; c) escape from the constraints of reality; d) isolation of
catastrophic experiences; e) cathartic discharge of certain feelings; f) analgesia; and g)
alteration of the sense of self, so that a traumatic event is experienced as if it was not
really happening to oneself.
Similar views have been proposed, from a psychodynamic perspective, that articulate
dissociative processes as reflecting intra-psychic defences, such as denial (e.g.
pretending that repeated trauma is not occurring) and splitting between a traumatised
and a coping-self, in order to diminish the impact of trauma (e.g. Fonagy, 1991; Mollon,
1996). However, as a defence, dissociation may be seen as having a double edge: it may
be adaptive in the short-term by providing protection from the immediate impact of
traumatic experiences, but may result in the long-term fragmentation of the self, which
may lead to further anxiety.
Other authors (e.g. Bentovim, 2002; Kluft, 1996; Mclntee & Crompton, 1997; Putman,
1997) have used a developmental perspective to formulate the traumatic origins of
dissociative processes within disorders such as DID and borderline personality disorder
(BPD), and have suggested that childhood trauma (e.g. sexual, physical, emotional
abuse, neglect) leads to dissociation and failure to achieve the major developmental task
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of integrating discrete states of consciousness, as well as impacting on fundamental
functions, such as development of attachments, emotion regulation, and development of
an adequate sense of self. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that childhood trauma is
predictive of pathological dissociation in adult clinical and non-clinical samples (e.g.
Anderson, Yasenik & Ross, 1993; Brunner, Parzer, Schuld & Resch, 2000; Carlson,
Armstrong, Loewenstein & Roth, 1998; Irwin, 1999; Kroll, Fiszdon & Crosby, 1996;
Lipschitz, Kaplan, Sorkenn, Chomey & Asnis, 1996; van der Kolk et al., 1996).
Nonetheless, the presence of a simple linear relationship between trauma, dissociation
and trauma-related psychopathology has been questioned by some authors (e.g. Frankel,
1996; Gershuny & Thayer, 1999; Merckelbach & Muris, 2001; Merckelbach,
Horselenberg & Schmidt, 2002; Tillman, Nash & Lemer, 1994). The main arguments
put forward are that other factors may intervene in the emergence of psychopathology,
and that the link between trauma and dissociation may be mediated by other variables,
such as fear of death and fear of loss/lack of control. However, while the first argument
appears to be valid (as supported also by the literature reviewed in Section 2. 3.), to date,
the latter is based on theoretical speculations or studies that looked at the mediating
factors of fantasy proneness and absent-mindedness in the relationship between
retrospective self-reported trauma and dissociation in student samples, rather than
clinical populations. Even so, structural equation modeling provided equivalent
goodness-of-fit statistics for both the mediated and the more direct linear models
(Merckelbach et al., 2002).
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Summarising several strands of research, Butler, Duran et al. (1996) proposed an
understanding of the development of dissociative symptomatology based on a diathesis-
stress model. According to this model of dissociation, the diathesis is the capacity of an
individual to dissociate (or hypnotisability), which has been shown to be normally
distributed in clinical and non-clinical samples, with relatively higher tendencies for
females, an increase from mid-childhood to adolescence, and subsequent decline with
age (e.g. Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Ross, et al., 1990; Ross, Ryan, Anderson, Ross &
Hardy, 1989; Torem, Hermanowsky & Curdue, 1992). Moreover, in support of this
diathesis, recent studies have also found a significant positive correlation between
dissociative tendencies and the personality trait of neuroticism in both clinical and non¬
clinical populations (Goldberg, 1999; Groth-Marnat & Jeffs, 2002), as well as state and
trait anxiety (Wolfradt & Meyer, 1998), and schizotypy (Bauer & Power, 1995). On the
other hand, what constitutes the stress component in this model is a traumatic experience
due to either an external event or intra-psychic distress. The authors argue that severe
traumatic experiences during childhood development are particularly likely to increase
dissociative processes. Especially in the face of repeated trauma, these defensive
processes may become too important to fade and decline during late adolescence,
leaving an individual entrenched in a hypertrophied defence style, which may generalise
and be used indiscriminately, to include also non-abusive or non-traumatic situations.
This "auto-hypnotic process" is thought to result in pathological dissociation and cause
disruption in the domains of perception, behaviour, will, affect, memory, and identity
(i.e. interfere with the content and control of awareness).
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Recently, a cognitive model has been put forward in an attempt to elucidate the
processes implicated in dissociative phenomena, based on Beck's (1996) cognitive
theory of personality and psychopathology (Kennedy, Clarke, Stopa, Bell, Rouse,
Ainsworth, Fearon & Waller, 2004). Beck (1996) argued that personality is a composite
of modes, defined as a set of schemas in charge of processing cognitive, behavioural,
affective, and physiological information, as well as generating responses. Moreover, he
proposed that orienting schemas automatically (i.e. without conscious effort) process
internal and external events and activate different modes accordingly, so that in normal
circumstances there is a smooth exchange of information between schemas and
switching between personality modes depending on the context, as appropriate.
Kennedy et al. (2004) suggest that dissociation is the result of inhibitory "decoupling" of
mental processes occurring at three different stages. At stage I, we can find automatic
dissociation, which is the result of preconscious decoupling of the links occurring at the
orienting schema level between perception, emotions and cognitions. This is a
mechanism that inhibits the early associative stage of information processing, when
material can be identified as being threatening, and may result in fragmented memory
traces of an event. Dissociation at this level may lead to de-contextualised activation of
fragments which would be manifested, for example, as visual or auditory hallucinatory
experiences. The authors draw parallels between this mechanism and van der Hart et
al.'s (1996) primary dissociation, as well as Brewin et al.'s (1996) SAM system.
At stage II, we can notice within-mode dissociation, which involves the strategic
decoupling of the associative links between schemas (cognitive, behavioural, affective,
and physiological) within a given mode. Dissociation at this level has implications for
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storage and retrieval of information and may result in cognitive symptoms (e.g. intrusive
thoughts, mind going blank), behavioural symptoms (e.g. ritualistic behaviour, re-
enactment), affective symptoms (e.g. emotional flattening), and physiological symptoms
(e.g. pain, analgesia, loss of function). The authors compare the cognitive element of this
mechanism to Brewin et al.'s (1996) VAM system, and the affective element to van der
Hart et al.'s (1996) secondary dissociation. Finally, at stage III we can observe between-
mode dissociation, which is the result of the partial or total decoupling of different
modes. This type of dissociation can take place to varying degrees, ranging from minor
decoupling resulting in state-switches characteristic of BPD, depersonalisation and
derealisation, to more extreme forms resulting in psychogenic amnesia and multiple or
alter personalities characteristic ofDID. As such, it is comparable to van der Hart et al.'s
(1996) tertiary dissociation.
This new cognitive model of dissociation has not yet been validated by much supporting
evidence. In fact, it is based on previous models which are not entirely corroborated and
appears to suggest a quasi-linear progression from one stage of dissociation to the next,
without stating clearly what the relationship between the three different types of
dissociation is. However, it appears to have more explanatory power in comparison with
previous models, and it makes some explicit hypothetical predictions based on previous
research, which may be empirically tested. Consequently, in our investigation we shall
draw more heavily on it compared to previous models of dissociation.
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The literature reviewed in this Section brings to light a number of important points: a)
the broad presence of dissociation from non-pathological to pathological levels in non¬
clinical and clinical populations; b) the intricate relationship between traumatic and
dissociative experiences; c) the plausible defensive function of dissociation in
attenuating trauma-related distress; d) the disruptive effects of dissociation on cognitive
processes; and e) the potentially important role played by dissociative processes in the
exacerbation and/or maintenance of trauma-related symptomatology as a result of their
prolonged unintentional "misuse".
Accordingly, and for the purpose of this study, we shall define dissociation as a
multidimensional phenomenon that leads to the fragmentation of (typically) trauma-
related information processing, the compartmentalisation of experience at different
levels (e.g. Kennedy et al., 2004), and as having the main defensive function of
lessening/avoiding an individual's psychological distress in relation to the same
traumatic events. As such, pathological dissociation is hypothesised to occur
predominantly in individuals with a history of trauma, especially during the experience
of potentially threatening events. Over time, it becomes reinforced and develops into a
maladaptive way of coping, which results in the disruption of awareness, voluntary
control, and contributes to the maintenance of trauma-related symptoms.
In the next Section we shall attempt to integrate the theoretical models and empirical
evidence reviewed thus far (with particular emphasis on Brewin et al.'s (1996) and
Kennedy et al.'s (2004) cognitive models of PTSD and dissociation), and to evaluate
their relevance to psychosis.
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2. 5. The link between trauma, dissociation and psychosis.
As we have seen above, the occurrence of traumatic life events and dissociative
experiences in the general population is relatively common, and a strong link between
the two has been proposed (e.g. Gershuny & Thayer, 1999). We have also drawn
attention to the fact that psychotic symptoms (e.g. hallucinations and delusions) are also
experienced in the general population (e.g. Kendler et al., 1996), especially in stressful
or traumatic circumstances (e.g. following bereavement, in extreme sensory deprivation,
in hostage situations). Moreover, we have reported evidence suggesting that dissociation
and schizotypy exist as personality traits in the general population and that they are
positively correlated (Bauer & Power, 1995; Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam & van Os,
2003; Pope & Kwapil, 2000; Startup, 1999; Waller, Putnam & Carlson, 1996).
Therefore, it would seem reasonable to hypothesise that the experience of perceived
stressful or traumatic life events is bound to increase the likelihood of the co-occurrence
of both dissociative and psychotic experiences in the same individual.
In recent years, several authors have observed a high prevalence of PTSD
symptomatology in people with psychosis (e.g. Frame & Morrison, 2001; McGorry et
al., 1991; Meyer et al., 1999; Mueser et al., 1998; Mueser, Salyers, Rosenberg, Ford,
Fox & Carty, 2001; Neria, Bromet, Sievers, Lavelle & Fochtmann, 2002; Resnick et al.,
2003; Seedat et al., 2003). Specifically, in the clinical samples examined, the prevalence
of PTSD ranged from 11 to 67%, and PTSD symptoms were related to three main
factors: a) the presence of past trauma (especially in childhood); b) the experience of
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psychosis; and c) hospitalisation. Moreover, levels of distress and intrusive memories of
such negative events have been found to be significantly related to high levels of anxiety
and dissociative symptoms in this client group (Shaw et al., 2002).
Whilst the frequent presence of post-psychotic PTSD, as well as of post-psychotic
depression (e.g. Rooke & Birchwood, 1998), seriously questions the adequacy of the
concept of "non-affective psychosis" (cf. Birchwood, 2003), it has been noted that the
way in which individuals deal with the trauma of psychosis, although idiosyncratic,
tends to vary within a limited number of roughly distinct patterns (Fowler et ah, 1995).
Many people who experience a psychotic episode react by resigning to the "fact" that
their lives have changed forever and by assuming the social role of a chronic mental
patient. They may become engulfed in the sick role, be overly dependent, and present
with a range of emotional reactions (e.g. anxiety, depression, shame, anger, helplessness,
hopelessness, entrapment, suicidal ideation), which may be indicative of what Ehlers
and Clark (2000) termed "mental defeat" in relation to severe reactions to trauma.
Other people cope with the trauma of psychosis by denying the presence of any
difficulties or showing no awareness. This way of coping has similarities with the
recovery style referred to as sealing over by McGlashan (1987): a process by which an
individual views his/her psychotic experiences as alien, avoids any attempts at
investigating/understanding his/her symptoms, minimises them, and isolates them by
conscious suppression or unconscious repression. It is argued here that this
psychological process may be understood as a sustained state of disbelief comparable to
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Horowitz's (1997) description of the initial shock response to trauma (see also Jackson,
Tait, Birchwood & Trower, 2002). Moreover, we propose that this coping mechanism
may be mediated by a state of dissociation that ranges from within-mode (or secondary)
to between-mode (or tertiary) depending on the degree of sealing over. Specifically,
within-mode dissociation would decouple the cognitive and affective components of a
traumatic event which, as argued by Eberly et al. (1991) from an evolutionary
perspective, has the adaptive value of allowing an individual to disentangle the
emotional from the rational aspects of the event and foster self preservation. Between-
mode dissociation, on the other hand, would have the adaptive function of preserving the
"healthy self' of an individual. Putnam (1993) has argued that among the defensive
functions of dissociation is the alteration of the sense of self, so that a traumatic event is
experienced as if it is not really happening to oneself, and a sense of escape from the
constraints of reality. Given the trauma of psychosis, it is proposed that individuals may
well attempt to protect their sense of self by dissociating. However, symptoms of
depersonalisation and derealisation would necessarily encumber one's relationship with
oneself and the world, seriously compromising an individual's ability to test reality.
Another way of dealing with the emergence of a psychotic episode is accepting one's
predicament and being able to adapt and make lifestyle adjustments in order to maximise
independent functioning. This coping pattern is similar to McGlashan's (1987) notion of
integration, characterised by an individual's awareness of his/her mental state before,
during and after a psychotic episode, curiosity about his/her experience, and
commitment to understanding with the help of others. In this case, trauma-related
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symptoms appear to drive some individuals towards the generation of meaning of their
psychotic episode and they are likely to experience PTG. This recovery style has been
associated with better engagement with mental health services and better outcome (e.g.
Tait, Birchwood & Trower, 2003; 2004; Thompson, McGorry & Harrigan, 2003). It is
argued that individuals who use integration as a coping style may make less use of
dissociative processes, at least at the between-mode/tertiary level.
Although McGlashan (1987) maintained that sealing over and integration are best
conceived as enduring personality traits, other authors have pointed out that an
individual's pattern of reactions to psychosis is variable over time, as it is likely to
fluctuate between resignation, denial and acceptance (Fowler et al., 1995). This is
supported by Thompson et al.'s (2003) study of outcome in first-episode psychosis, who
found that recovery style changed over time; and by Lindbom-Jakobson and Lindgren's
(2001) study of people who had experienced political persecution and torture, who
observed that both coping styles were parts of the working through of traumatic events.
In particular the authors found that it was easier for individuals to integrate hate and
aggression evoked by the torture trauma, than feelings of guilt and shame, which were
dealt with preferentially by sealing over. These findings are consistent with the fact that
individuals with psychosis who seal over tend to exhibit higher levels of depression,
make more negative self-evaluations, report negative early experiences (i.e. uncaring
parents) and generally tend to appraise greater loss and shame in their psychosis,
compared to those who integrate their psychotic experiences into their wider life
experiences (Birchwood, Iqbal, Chadwick & Trower 2000; Drayton, Birchwood &
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Trower, 1998; Iqbal, Birchwood, Chadwick & Trower, 2000). To this effect, Birchwood
and colleagues have argued that "sealing over is an adaptive but ineffective strategy for
coping with the trauma of psychosis".
This analysis is also concordant with the psychodynamic view of psychosis, which
emphasises the importance of traumatic childhood experiences in the origins of the
disorder, and the overuse and reliance on immature defence mechanisms to protect the
fragile self from anxiety (i.e. unbearable affect and cognition); and indeed, dissociation
has been seen as part of an immature defence style (Butler, Duran, et al., 1996).
Relating once again these types of recovery styles to conceptualisations of trauma, it
appears that the distinction between integration and sealing over is analogous to
Horowitz's (1997) proposition that two psychological processes are in action following
trauma: one that tends to promote the resolving of the trauma by bringing it to mind, and
a second one that mobilises defence mechanisms that tend to avoid it. It seems therefore
reasonable to suggest that individuals will differ in their response to the trauma of
psychosis by integrating their experience or by sealing over and avoiding it depending
on their current capacity for adaptation, which will rest on a number of protective and
risk factors (e.g. social support, additional life stresses, pre-morbid coping style, etc.).
Connected to this point and referring to defence mechanisms, Vaillant (1994) argued
that often psychopathology is not merely the result of life stresses, but also of an
individual's idiosyncratic response to his/her stressful environment. Consequently, a
clinician who includes the client's defensive style as part of the formulation will be in a
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better position to understand what may initially appear most irrational about the client,
and to recognise the adaptive and maladaptive value of the client's defensive distortions
of his/her inner and outer reality.
Given the intricate relationship between trauma and psychosis, Morrison et al. (2003)
have recently reviewed current research literature on the topic, and have suggested that
there is sufficient evidence to support, at least in part, three alternative views of their
link. The first of these views is that experiencing a psychotic episode, especially for the
first time, is a traumatic life event and, as such, it may cause PTSD in some individuals.
Clinical case studies describe the terrifying nature of psychotic episodes (e.g. Shaner &
Eth, 1989). The subjective experience of "going mad" or "losing one's mind", the highly
distressing nature of hallucinations and delusions, and the experience of psychiatric
services (e.g. compulsory hospitalisation, being held in a locked ward with other acutely
psychotic people, being forcibly medicated), clearly represent major traumatic life
events for which post-trauma conceptualisations would apply, whether these are
experienced for the first time or constitute a relapse. In fact, the psychological
implications for an individual who develops psychosis, at a personal level and within
his/her interpersonal context, are the same as the ones described in various theories of
PTSD reported above. For instance, Janoff-Bulman's (1992) notion of shattered pre¬
existing assumptions about the self, the world and the future, would very much apply to
people developing psychosis at any point in their lives, and especially so at a young age.
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The second view proposed by Morrison et al. (2003) is that trauma may cause psychosis
in some individuals. This idea is based on the observation of high prevalence rates of
trauma in people with psychosis (reported above), and the influence of negative life
events in precipitating psychotic symptoms, although social and cognitive variables may
modulate their relationship (e.g. Bebbington, Wilkins, Sham, Jones, van Os, Murray,
Toone & Lewis, 1996; Bebbington, Wilkins, Jones, Foerster, Murray, Toone & Lewis,
1993; Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, Delespaul & van Os, 2003; Norman & Malla,
1993). Moreover, it has been suggested that the negative subjective experience of
prodromal and residual symptomatology in itself may also act as cumulative traumatic
stress, which may aggravate symptoms and lead to a full-blown psychotic episode
(Stampfer, 1990).
We argue that, following the resolution of an acute psychotic episode, the experience of
delusions and/or hallucinations may be considered a prime source of cumulative
traumatic stress. The individual may have to deal with this internally generated traumatic
information typically laden with negative affect on a daily basis for protracted periods of
time. In this sense, the experience of psychosis may be thought of as the internalisation
of traumatic events, and the establishment of a quasi-perpetual self-generating cycle of
trauma. Accordingly, Ehlers and Clark's (2000) model of PTSD may be invoked to
account for PTSD symptoms in individuals with psychosis arisen as the result of their
perception of external or internal threat to the self and their future.
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The third possibility entertained by Morrison and colleagues (2003) is that PTSD and
psychosis may be comparable disorders and part of a spectrum of responses to traumatic
life events. This hypothesis is partly based on observations regarding the similarity of
symptoms of PTSD and psychosis. Specifically, symptoms such as increased levels of
arousal, hypervigilance, interrupted sleep, emotional numbing, detachment from others,
derealisation, and general neglect, appear to be common to the two disorders; whereas,
intrusive thoughts, images, and flashbacks, are often experienced in the form of
auditory, visual, olfactory, or tactile hallucinations and are accompanied by paranoia
(e.g. Butler et al., 1996).
Both Brewin et al. (1996) and Ehlers and Clark (2000) propose that trauma memories,
having received no or little conscious attention, are poorly elaborated, lack spatial-
temporal context, and are retrieved unintentionally. This seems to be consistent with the
view that dissociated information is patchy, lacks the normal contextual links and may
come to consciousness involuntarily. Moreover, given these attributes, trauma-related
information may appear to come out from nowhere and feel alien; experiences that
individuals with hallucinations are well acquainted with.
Furthermore, Morrison et al. (2003) point out that both disorders are positively related to
levels of dissociation (typically measured by self-report questionnaires such as the
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986)), and include
common cognitive and behavioural maintaining processes, such as negative appraisal of
intrusions, negative attributional biases, a "search for meaning", selective attention,
avoidance and other safety behaviours.
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Despite the inherent methodological difficulty in differentiating overlapping concepts
and the risk of a circular argument which culminates with the construction of a
conclusive "integrative" model (cf. Morrison et al., 2003), the main tenet of this thesis is
that dissociation plays a pivotal role in the relationship between trauma and psychosis,
particularly in relation to the formation and maintenance of symptomatology.
Specifically, we hypothesise that the psychological processes by which this developing
and exacerbating/maintaining mechanism may operate rely heavily on the cognitive by¬
products of the defence mechanism of dissociation, and that Brewin et al.'s (1996) dual
representation theory of PTSD and Kennedy et al.'s (2004) cognitive model of
dissociation provide an account of some of the specific cognitive underpinnings of these
processes.
Figure 2. 1., below, gives a graphical representation of the proposed model of trauma,
dissociation and psychosis. In the course of Chapters 1 and 2, we have reported evidence
which suggests that early traumatic life events, as experienced by the great majority of
individuals with psychosis, may render individuals susceptible to the use of immature
defence mechanisms (dissociation included) when dealing with difficulties (e.g. Butler,
Duran, et al., 1996; Frosh, 1983). This distal vulnerability, together with other
contributory factors identified by several lines of investigations, is thought to lead some
individuals to the development of psychosis (e.g. Bentall, 2003). We have also seen that
psychotic symptoms, such as hallucinations and delusions (resulting from projection or
misattribution) may in themselves serve the defensive function of maintaining a positive
view of oneself (e.g. Lyon et al., 1994; Morrison et al., 1995).
66
Figure2.1Acognitivemod lftra ma,dissocia ondpsychosis. Othercontributoryfa tors (e.g.J,support,genetic vulnerability,fEE,drug abuse,roletr nsition) (Distalcon ributoryfactorst thedevelopmentfpsychosis) Early traumatic► lifeev ntstUseof dissociation
tSealingover




tDissociation (disruptionof awareness, voluntaryc ntrol, realitytesting)
CDI
tFragmentationofen alrepr sentati ns+ tVulnerabilitytounconsciousactivati nf trauma-relatedmemori s







o o o 3
Secondary/ Within- mode Primary/ Automatic
Note.CDI=ognitive-DefensiveInterlock.
It has also been argued that the experience of psychosis constitutes a traumatic life event
in its own right and that, as such, it may lead to the development of trauma-related
symptomatology, including dissociative processes (e.g. Jackson et al., 2004; Morrison et
al., 2003; Shaw et al., 2002). On the other hand, although dissociation occurring at
different levels of information processing has been identified as a psychological defence
against trauma-related distress, it also has the effect of interfering with an individual's
content and control of awareness, and his/her ability to test reality (e.g. Butler, Duran et
al., 1996; Gershuny & Thayer, 1999; Kennedy et al., 2004; van der Kolk et al., 1996),
which has been hypothesised to be crucial in the development and maintenance of
psychotic symptoms (e.g. Allen et al., 1997).
We propose that dissociative processes in response to trauma are instrumental in the
formation and maintenance of hallucinations and delusions, and that two (not mutually
exclusive) different routes, determined by the level at which they operate, can be
identified. The first of these routes (bottom part of Figure 2. 1.) is hypothesised to be
mediated by dissociation occurring at a primary/automatic level, and that it is part of a
primitive subcortical evolutionary inherited traumatic stress response (cf. Sloman,
1996). At this level, (peri-traumatic) dissociative processes act at an early stage of
information processing by severing associative links between perception, cognitions and
emotions, and by fragmenting the mental representation of traumatic experiences (e.g.
Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers and Clark, 2000). The disruption of normal attentional and
memory processes, the resulting disintegrated representational format of events, and the
reduced awareness and voluntary control (all "side effects" of the defensive function of
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dissociation) increase an individual's vulnerability to the unconscious de-contextualised
activation of trauma-related memories, which are experienced as further hallucinations
and delusions (cf. Butler et al., 1996). In turn, the subjective negative appraisal of the
psychotic symptoms and the generation of further traumatic distress ("side effects" of
the defensive functions of hallucinations and delusions) are expected to kindle further
dissociation.
The second route (top part of Figure 2. 1.) is hypothesised to hinge on within-
mode/secondary and between-mode/tertiary levels of dissociation (Kennedy et al., 2004;
van der Hart et al., 1996) and to rely on a more developed cortical response system that
involves reasoning (cf. Sloman, 1996). In this case, dissociative processes operate by
decoupling the associative links between schemas (cognitive, behavioural, affective, and
physiological) and by compartmentalising different personality modes, to the extent that
an individual is able to either attenuate or deny the impact of the experience of psychosis
in his/her life. However, this contributes to a varying degree of sealing over adopted by
an individual, which is a recovery style that has been associated with lower personal
resilience, poorer engagement with mental health services and higher risk of relapse
(Tait et al., 2003; 2004).
In summary, it is hypothesised that the adaptive and maladaptive defensive functions of
dissociation on the one hand, and of delusions and hallucinations on the other, are likely
to combine and develop an entrapping psychological mechanism for individuals with
psychosis. We shall refer to this mechanism as the cognitive-defensive interlock (CDI): a
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dynamic feedback loop that relies on the cognitive by-products of evolutionary
developed defence mechanisms (cf. Teasdale & Barnard's (1993) depressive interlock
within the interacting cognitive subsystems (ICS) model, and Gumley, White & Power's
(1999) adaptation of this model to psychotic disorders). It is proposed here that the CDI
is a major contributor to the maintenance of psychotic symptoms, in that, the interaction
of dissociative, hallucinatory and delusional processes establishes a self-perpetuating
cycle that acts to maintain a persistent negative set of affective states (e.g. anxiety,
depression, shame, anger). Of course, all of these hypothesised processes need empirical
verification.
2. 6. Summary.
As intended, we have started this Chapter by giving a broad overview of trauma within
which we have placed existing influential cognitive theories of PTSD. We have then
reviewed current models of dissociation and have related them to the view of trauma and
traumatic stress reactions outlined above. Finally, we have provided an evaluative
synthesis of the theoretical approaches and ideas considered so far and have extrapolated
convergent conceptualisations of trauma, dissociation, and psychosis in order to
disentangle some of the plausible processes underlying their relationship. In doing so,
we have also put forward a number of theoretical proposals, some of which will
constitute the basis for more specific hypotheses to be tested experimentally in our
investigation reported in the next Chapter.
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Chapter 3
An experimental investigation of trauma, dissociation and psychosis.
"When vain desire at last and vain regret
go hand in hand to death, and all is vain,
what shall assuage the unforgotten pain
and teach the unforgetfiil to forget?"
(Dante Gabriel Rossetti, "The House ofLife ")
3. 1. Introduction.
In the course of the previous two Chapters, we have reviewed current literature on
psychosis, trauma and dissociation and have endeavoured to build the case for the
crucial role played by dissociative processes in the contribution towards the
development and maintenance of psychotic symptoms (chiefly, hallucinations and
delusions) in response to the experience of traumatic events.
From our review of cognitive models of PTSD and dissociation, we have also seen that
the format of the mental representations of trauma-related information is a key feature of
the postulated mechanisms of symptom formation and maintenance. Therefore, from an
information processing point of view, the basic cognitive processes underlying any
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mental activity, namely, attention and memory, are of primary relevance for our
understanding of these phenomena.
In this Chapter, we report an experimental study of attention and memory for trauma-
related, positive, and neutral information in a sample of people with psychosis compared
to a matched healthy control group. We also used measures of current psychological
impact of trauma, dissociation, symptomatology and recovery style in our experimental
group in order to examine their relationship, and also their potential impact on the
participants' performance on the experimental tasks. With these two aims in mind, we
attempt to present some initial empirical testing of the two routes outlined earlier in our
CDI model by which dissociative processes are hypothesised to contribute to symptom
formation and maintenance. However, before the presentation of the empirical work we
shall review some of the relevant literature in the field of attention, memory and
dissociation.
3. 2. Review of relevant experimental research.
One of the tenets of cognitive psychopathological theories is that differences in how
individuals process information (emotional information, in particular) may play a crucial
role in the aetiology, development, maintenance, and treatment of emotional disorders
(e.g. Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). Consequently, over the past two decades researchers
have increasingly turned to information processing paradigms derived from
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experimental cognitive psychology in order to understand attentional and mnemonic
biases occurring at different levels of information processing.
One of the tasks commonly employed in order to investigate attentional processes is an
emotional adaptation of the classic Stroop colour-naming task (Stroop, 1938) known as
the emotional Stroop task. In this task, participants are typically shown coloured words
that are emotionally laden or neutral and are asked to name the colour (or press a
corresponding coloured key) of each word while attempting to ignore the word itself.
Several authors have applied this paradigm with a number of different client groups
(meeting diagnostic criteria for particular anxiety disorders), and have found that
participants are generally slower at naming the colour of words associated with their
personal concerns (compared to neutral words), showing selective attention for
emotionally relevant stimuli (for a review, see Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996).
This is the case also for individuals with PTSD who appear to show a particularly large
interference effect (e.g. Buckley, Blanchard & Neill, 2000; McNally, 1995; Williams et
al., 1996).
To the best of our knowledge, the only study that has explicitly examined the effect of
dissociation on attentional processes is DePrince and Freyd's (1999) investigation in two
groups of college students (N = 54 in each group) selected on the basis of their high or
low scores on the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986).
The authors assessed attention and memory performance in two conditions. The first
consisted of a standard emotional Stroop task (selective attention) followed by an
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incidental free recall task; whereas, the second condition consisted of a divided attention
emotional Stroop task, in which participants were asked to name the colour of each word
as quickly and accurately as possible, while also remembering the words for a memory
test at the end of the task, which was in fact followed by a free recall task. Results
indicated that the high-DES group exhibited more interference on the selective attention
version and less interference on the divided attention version of the emotional Stroop
task, and also recalled fewer emotionally laden words (especially in the second
condition) compared to the low-DES group. The authors interpreted these findings by
suggesting that high-dissociators may perform better when dual-tasking than low-
dissociators, who perform best when focusing their attention. Given the relationship
between trauma and dissociation, and adopting an evolutionary view, DePrince and
Freyd (1999) proposed further that individuals who experience traumatic life events and
dissociate, may leam to dual-task as a way of managing and controlling the flow of
incoming information, that is, keep information that is at odds with survival goals away
from consciousness. However, their study was carried out with college students rather
than a clinical sample, and it did not include any measure of trauma.
In contrast, a number of studies have investigated memory processes in clients with a
diagnosis ofPTSD or DID, which have also included a measure of dissociation.
Research on memory and PTSD seems to indicate the presence of implicit and explicit
memory biases favouring trauma-related material, but also confusion, disorganisation,
and forgetting of specific autobiographical memories (e.g. Buckley et al., 2000;
McNally, 1995). These seemingly contrasting findings could be interpreted as reflecting
74
the alternation of arousal and avoidance states, or the two psychological processes
proposed by Horowitz (1997), or the relative influence of the SAM and VAM systems
(Brewin et al., 1996), or a combination of the three.
Because of this pattern of results, recent investigations have used the experimental task
known as directed forgetting task (DFT), to assess the ability of people with PTSD to
engage in selective forgetting (or remembering) of stimuli (usually lists of emotionally
laden and neutral words) that participants have been instructed to remember or to forget
(e.g. Johnson, 1994). Typically, there are two versions of this task that vary in the way
the stimuli to-be-remembered (TBR) or to-be-forgotten (TBF) are designated. In the list
method, halfway through the task, participants are instructed to forget the first half of the
list of words and to remember the ones presented during the second part of the task. In
the word method, participants are instructed to remember or to forget each word
immediately after individual presentations. Using either method, at the end of the task,
participants are given a surprise recall test for the entire set of stimuli (i.e. TBR and
TBF). Directed forgetting occurs when participants recall less of the TBF than of the
TBR set of words. It has been suggested that the directed forgetting effect (DFE) is
likely to be due to retrieval inhibition when the list method is used, since a reasonable
amount of processing would have already been allocated to the TBF words, once the
instructions to forget are given. On the other hand, when the word method is used, the
DFE is likely to be due to differences in encoding/rehearsal and storage, since the cue to
remember would direct participants to continue to process a stimulus, whereas, a cue to
forget would direct participants to discontinue the processing (Basden, Basden &
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Gargano, 1993; MacLeod, 1999). However, whichever processes might be responsible, a
DFE is usually obtained only when explicit but not implicit memory is tested. Explicit
memory refers to conscious recollection of previously presented information.
Conversely, implicit memory refers to facilitation in task performance that is attributable
to information acquired during a previous study phase although no conscious reference
to this information is made (e.g. Schacter, 1987). Consequently, these two types of
memory are also referred to as conscious and unconscious, respectively.
Using the DFT with positive, negative, and neutral words, Cloitre, Cancienne, Brodsky,
Dulit and Perry (1996) tested explicit and implicit memory performance in a group of
women with borderline personality disorder (BPD) and a history of parental abuse, a
group with BPD but no parental abuse, and a control group (N = 24 in each group).
Although the affective valence of the stimuli had to be dropped from the data analyses
due to the low numbers of recalled words in each cell, the authors found that the abused
BPD group showed an overall greater recall for TBR but no poorer recall for TBF
stimuli in the explicit memory condition compared to the other two groups; whereas, no
differences were found in the implicit memory performance of the three groups. Cloitre
et al. (1996) interpreted these unexpected findings by suggesting that individuals who
have been abused in childhood may develop the capacity to focus their attention on
designated events (e.g. not associated with the abuse) as a way of coping. Interestingly,
memory for TBR but not TBF stimuli was significantly correlated with DES scores,
indicating perhaps a propensity for absorption. However, this study did not assess the
presence of PTSD symptoms.
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Another study (McNally, Metzger, Lasko, Clancy & Pitman, 1998) used the DFT with a
group of adult (women) survivor of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) with PTSD (N= 14),
a group ofwomen with a history of CSA but no PTSD (N - 12), and a control group (N
= 12). As expected, the authors found a standard DFE (i.e. more TBR than TBF words
were recalled). However, against predictions, they also found that the PTSD group did
not recall fewer TBR or TBF trauma-related than positive or neutral words, but it did
exhibit recall deficits for TBR positive and neutral words compared to the other two
groups. Therefore, these data were deemed to be inconsistent with the hypothesis of an
avoidant encoding or impaired explicit memory for trauma-related information in PTSD.
Although the CSA-PTSD group yielded significantly higher scores on the DES, this
measure was not related to test performance by the authors.
In a later similar study, McNally et al. (2001) found a standard DFE, but no support for
the hypothesis of a specific avoidant encoding for trauma-related information, as tested
by free recall, in either a repressed-memory CSA group (N = 13), or a recovered-
memory CSA group (N = 13), compared to a control group (N = 15). Once again, the
higher DES and trauma measure scores in the CSA groups were not related by the
authors to memory performance. DePrince and Freyd (2001) argued that the failure to
obtain a differential recall for trauma-related information in McNally et al.'s (1998)
study was due to the lack of appreciation for the importance of the attentional context
during the DFT. Specifically, based on the findings of their previous study on attention,
memory and dissociative tendencies reported above (DePrince & Freyd, 1999), the
authors hypothesised that this effect would be found in conditions of divided attention
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(i.e. performing the DFT and a parallel simple task at the same time). In fact, in their
sample of college students they found that a high-DES group recalled more neutral and
fewer trauma-related TBR words compared to a low-DES group (N = 24 in each group),
in a free recall but not in a recognition task, and only in the condition of divided
attention but not selective attention. The authors suggested that dissociation may be
adaptive in keeping threatening information from awareness under certain
circumstances. Moreover, they proposed that a task requiring divided attention may be
more ecologically valid because it approximates more closely the real world, where
individuals need to deal frequently with divided attention demands in daily life.
However, despite the promising findings reported in this study, participants were college
students and no measure of trauma was employed.
More recently, Zoellner et al. (2003) suggested that the failure to support the relationship
between avoidant encoding style and PTSD in Cloitre et al.'s (1996) and McNally et
al.'s (1998) studies is probably due to the alternation between arousal and avoidant
states in this client group, so that, when individuals are in arousal state, an avoidant style
may not be detected. To test this hypothesis, the authors used the DFT preceded by
either a "serenity" or a "dissociation" mood induction procedure to compare the
performance of a PTSD and a control group (N- 28 in each group; N= 14 once divided
by mood induction) in both a free recall and a recognition task. Zoellner et al. (2003)
found similar results in the free recall and recognition tasks, with a standard DFE being
obtained following the serenity induction, but not following the dissociation induction,
which impaired memory for TBR rather than TBF stimuli. Moreover, against their
78
hypotheses these effects were found in both groups, who also recalled comparable
proportions of trauma-related words. The authors explained the elimination of the DFE
in the dissociation condition by suggesting that state dissociation may impair the
elaboration of incoming information (encoding), and/or may also impair source
monitoring (i.e. remember which words were TBR or TBF). Therefore, consistent with
previous findings, this study showed no evidence of an avoidant or an intrusive encoding
style for trauma-related material in PTSD, although it is very plausible that the mood
induction used in this study (i.e. reading a number of relevant phrases such as, "I feel
disconnected from my body") may be qualitatively different from dissociation in the real
world.
In this regard, two recent studies that have used the DFT in clients with dissociative
identity disorder (DID) may help clarify the role of dissociation in conscious and
unconscious memory. The first study (Elzinga, de Beurs, Sergeant, van Dyck & Phaf,
2000) compared the performance of a group of individuals with a diagnosis ofDID (N =
14), and two groups of university students with high (N = 20) and low (N = 23)
dissociation scores, on implicit and explicit memory for sex, threat, and neutral words.
<
The test phase of the DFT was modified in order to separate the two types ofmemory by
using the process dissociation procedure (PDP; Jacoby, 1991). In line with the cognitive
avoidance hypothesis, it was expected that instructions to forget would reduce conscious
and enhance unconscious memory performance in individuals with high dissociative
ability. However, against predictions, the instructions to forget enhanced the overall
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(conscious and unconscious) memory performance in the DID group, especially for sex
words.
In a second study, Elzinga et al. (2003) investigated directed forgetting within and
between personality states of individuals with DID (N = 12) by asking them to switch
states between the initial study phase and the test phase, and then back to the initial state
for a second test phase. Using this procedure, the authors were able to show a DFE for
both emotional (sex/threat) and neutral words between states but not within the same
identity state. Thus, although participants were not able to inhibit information selectively
within the same state, they appeared to be able to do so when switching to a different
state. Moreover, there was a clear reduction in explicit memory performance between
states, whereas, implicit memory was largely preserved.
In summary, it would appear that dissociation may have an effect on attentional
processes by facilitating dual-tasking and performance under conditions of divided
attention (DePrince & Freyd, 1999; 2001), which may also help facilitate selective
attention and avoidance in some circumstances (Cloitre et al., 1996), or impair encoding
and source monitoring in other situations (Zoellner et al., 2003), although we are still to
determine when one or the other might take place.
The effects of dissociation on memory processes are also unclear, in that it may
contribute to eliminate the DFE (Zoellner et al., 2003), and even enhance retrieval for
trauma-related information (Elzinga et al., 2000), or it may facilitate conscious retrieval
inhibition while enhancing unconscious (implicit) memory (Elzinga et al., 2003).
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Unfortunately, while some empirical data exist for individuals with BPD, DID and
PTSD (although sample sizes are relatively small), our literature searches yielded no
study of trauma and dissociation that investigated experimentally attention and memory
processes for emotionally laden materials in individuals with psychosis. Therefore our
hypotheses regarding the performance on the tasks employed in our study was
necessarily based on the studies just reviewed as well as the theoretical background
presented earlier in this thesis.
3. 3. Hypotheses.
In order to investigate the potential role played by dissociative processes in the
maintenance of psychotic symptoms, as hypothesised above, we decided to examine
their relative influence on individuals' recovery style (i.e. level of integration vs. sealing
over) from the experience of psychosis, as well as the pathway of information
processing for trauma-related, positive, and neutral stimuli in both experimental and
control groups.
By doing so we hoped to provide some initial evidence for the presumed negative effects
on encoding, storage format, retrieval of information, and level of integration attributed
to dissociative processes on theoretical, and some empirical, grounds. Accordingly, our
study was set up to provide some preliminary evidence for the existence of a negative
interactive system between dissociative processes on the one side and hallucinatory and
delusional processes on the other, referred to as CDI in Chapter 2, Section 2. 5.
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As mentioned in the opening Section of this thesis, we employed two experimental
tasks. The first task was a DFT merged with an emotional Stroop task, referred to
hereafter as the Directed Forgetting Stroop Task (DFST), described in detail in the
Method Section below. This task was devised in order to provide us with the opportunity
to examine attentional processes, to present the study phase for the subsequently
administered memory task (see below), and to require participants to perform under
conditions of divided attention, which according to the experimental literature reviewed
above adds ecological validity and is more likely to involve dissociative processes.
Moreover, unlike all of the studies reported above that used the DFT, we used the list
rather than the word method. This choice was made based on four premises: a) the word
method is more likely to tap into encoding processes, which in our case would overlap
with the measure of attention we were already taking with the Stroop component of the
DFST; b) encoding disruption in the word method appears to be due to experimental
instructions (i.e. forget) rather than participants' natural selective processes, and as such
it might draw on different processes other than dissociation (which might help explain
some of the negative research findings in this field); c) the list method is more likely to
bring into play inhibitory processes and might help reveal the presence of hypothesised
different representational formats of memory systems, which might be exposed by the
relative proportion of participants' use of implicit and explicit memory; d) the results of
encoding processes are necessarily reflected in memory functioning because of their
temporal precedence.
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Following Elzinga et al.'s (2000) approach, during the test phase we applied the process
dissociation procedure (PDP; Jacoby, 1991) to a subsequently administered Word-Stem
Completion Task (WSCT), in order to discern and estimate the relative contribution of
dissociation to implicit and explicit memory processes. The PDP consists of two
contrasted conditions: inclusion and exclusion. In the inclusion condition, participants
are asked to complete the word-stems with previously presented words as much as
possible, and otherwise, with the first word that comes to mind. In this case, explicit
(conscious) and implicit (unconscious) memory processes work in the same direction. In
contrast, in the exclusion condition, participants are instructed to complete the word-
stems only with new words (i.e. not previously seen). This is an interference condition in
that if a trial is both consciously controlled and unconsciously influenced, then
conscious control and recollection override the unconscious influence and the word-stem
is completed with a new word.
Jacoby, Toth and Yonelinas (1993), proposed that conscious memory performance is
estimated by subtracting "slip of the tongue" completions in the exclusion condition
from the proportion of correctly completed words in the inclusion condition:
C = I - E
whereas, unconscious memory performance is estimated as:
U = E / (1 - C)
These formulae were used in our study to estimate conscious and unconscious memory
in the WSCT.
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We also used four self-report questionnaires and one observer rating scale measuring
current severity of psychotic symptomatology, present levels of reported trauma-related
symptoms, dissociation, and recovery style. As reported later on in the Method (Section
3. 4.), the Impact ofEvent Scale - Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 1997) was used to
assess current levels of trauma-related symptomatology with different referential
instructions for the experimental and control groups: the experience of psychosis and the
most traumatic/stressful event ever experienced, respectively. This had the aim of
gathering a current measure of trauma-related symptomatology in our healthy control
group in relation to having experienced as comparable as possible distressing/traumatic
life events that might affect their (trauma-related) information processing in our
experimental tasks.
In accordance with the background literature reviewed above, it was hypothesised that:
a) during the study phase, people with psychosis would show less interference
compared to controls, particularly for trauma-related stimuli, due to their higher
levels of dissociation and their presumed more developed ability towards
cognitive avoidance in tasks of divided attention;
b) a DFE would be found in both groups (psychosis and control) in their explicit,
but not implicit, memory performance;
c) compared to controls, people with psychosis would show a reduced conscious
and enhanced unconscious memory performance during the test phase,
particularly for trauma-related stimuli, which would indicate conscious retrieval
inhibition and facilitation of unconscious activation of information;
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d) in people with psychosis, current levels of trauma-related distress would predict
the degree of dissociation experienced;
e) in people with psychosis, trauma-related distress and dissociation would predict
both their enhanced unconscious memory performance (particularly for trauma-
related material) and their recovery style (i.e. degree of sealing over);
f) both enhanced unconscious memory performance and recovery style would
predict levels of current positive symptoms in our psychosis group.
3. 4. Method.
3. 4. 1. Experimental design.
The experimental design consisted of a mixed factorial design (3x2x2x2x2). There
were four within-subjects variables - Word-type (3: trauma-related, positive, categorised
neutral); Instruction (2: TBR, TBF); Condition (2: inclusion, exclusion); Stem-type (2:
old, new) - and one between-subjects variable - Group (2: psychosis, control).
The dependent variables were: accuracy and reaction times (RTs) in the DFST,
completion rates in each experimental condition of the WSCT, and scores from the self-
report measures and observer rating scale.
A-priori power analyses (Cohen, 1992; Erdfelder, Faul & Buchner, 1996; Green, 1991;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) showed that for multiple regression (with up to 2
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independent variables) and ANOVA (repeated measures) designs with a = .05, a sample
size ofN = 30 in each group was necessary in order to reveal a large effect size (f = .35)
at Power = .80; whereas, for t-test analyses a sample size ofN = 26 in each group was
necessary in order to reveal a large effect size (d = .80).
3. 4. 2. Participants.
Having obtained ethical approval for the execution of this study from the Lothian
Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix 1), two groups of participants were recruited.
The first group consisted of 30 individuals (21 males, 9 females; mean age = 40.77, SD
= 10.55) who had experienced one or more psychotic episodes in their lives and who
were currently well enough to consent and take part in the study. All participants had a
diagnosis of Schizophrenia, Paranoid Schizophrenia, Schizoaffective Disorder, or
Psychosis. Individuals with a diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder were excluded from this
study because, when in euthymic state, they do not usually present any evidence of
residual positive symptoms, the maintenance of which is the main topic of this research.
Participants in the psychosis (experimental) group were recruited from the Homecare
Team, a Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) based in the south-east of
Edinburgh. They were all currently engaged with the CMHT and received antipsychotic
medication.
In the first instance, potential participants were approached by their keyworker (one of
the Community Psychiatric Nurses working within the Team), were given a Patient
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Information Sheet (see Appendix 2.), and asked to take part in this study. In doing so,
the voluntary nature of participation was emphasised and they were given as long as
necessary to decide. On several occasions, I was introduced to individual clients who
required further information prior to, or after taking a decision.
The control group consisted of 30 healthy participants (21 males, 9 females; mean age =
40.73, SD = 10.53) with no known history of (or current) emotional disorder who were
matched to the psychosis group for age and sex. They consisted of an opportunity
sample and included hospital employees, and acquaintances.
3. 4. 3. Apparatus and materials.
Self-report questionnaires. The following self-report questionnaires were used and
administered in the given order (see Appendix 3.).
• Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995a). This is
a 42-item instrument designed to provide relatively pure measures of current
symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress. It has very good psychometric
properties (Cronbach's alphas ranging from .91 to .97, from .81 to .92, and from
.89 to .95 for the depression, anxiety, and stress scales respectively), and has
been evaluated both in non-clinical and clinical samples (Beuke, Fischer &
McDowall, 2003; Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch & Barlow, 1997; Lovibond,
1998; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995b). In this study we used the short 21-item
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version, which has similar properties and offers advantages for research purposes
over the longer version (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns & Swinson, 1998).
• Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Bernstein-
Carlson & Putnam, 1993). This is a 28-item measure of dissociative experiences.
It is the most widely used measure of dissociation and has shown to have very
good psychometric properties (mean Cronbach's a = .93) in several clinical
groups (e.g. van Ijzendoorn & Schuengel, 1996). Although this measure contains
3 subscales of dissociation (amnesia, depersonalisation/derealisation,
absorption/imaginative involvement), Bernstein-Carlson and Putnam (1993) have
claimed that the scale will reliably measure only the general dissociation factor,
therefore, we did not use the 3 separate subscales in this study. However, we
reported a second score derived from 8 items of the DES, the DES-T (Taxon)
which provides a measure of pathological dissociation (Waller et al., 1996).
• Impact ofEvent Scale - Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 1997). This is a 22-
item questionnaire evaluating experiences of avoidance, intrusion and
hyperarousal, which reflect the intensity of post-traumatic phenomena. It is a
widely used measure of PTSD symptomatology and it has been shown to have
good psychometric properties in clinical and non-clinical samples: Cronbach's a
= .87 for avoidance, a = .94 for intrusion, a = .91 for hyperarousal, and a = .91
for the total scale (Creamer, Bell & Failla, 2003).
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• Recovery Style Questionnaire (RSQ; Drayton et al., 1998). This is a 39-item self-
report measure designed as an alternative to the interview measure of recovery
style: Integration Sealing Over Scale (ISOS; McGlashan, Wadeson, Carpenter &
Levy, 1977). The RSQ requires participants to either agree or disagree with
statements about their attitude to their psychotic disorder, and consists of 13
subscales: curiosity, education, optimism, impact, fear, liking, continuity,
ownership, responsibility, help-seeking, blame, cause, and satisfaction. These are
used to calculate a global score, in percentage, ranging from sealing over to
integration, which may also be converted into 1 of 6 categories (e.g. 62-82% is
assigned 2 = "tends towards integration"). Although this instrument has not been
widely used, Drayton et al. (1998) reported Cronbach's a = .73, and a high
correlation with ISOS scores r - .92. In this thesis we used the global
dimensional score.
Experimental tasks. The following tasks were employed in this study in the given order.
Directed Forgetting Stroop Task (DFST). This task was a DFT merged with an
emotional Stroop task, both of which have been presented above. In this merged version,
we included 3 types of word stimuli: trauma-related, positive, and categorised neutral
(household items). A total of 120 words (40 of each type) were originally pooled
together from materials used in previous published experimental studies (e.g. McNally et
al., 1998; Myers, Brewin & Power, 1998) or appositely chosen anew for the present
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investigation. Seven independent fellow trainee clinical psychologists then judged each
word for its relevance to trauma, for its being positive, and for its being neutral, using a
10-point scale (1 = not at all; 10 = extremely). Mean values were obtained for each word
on the three scales and a number of stimuli were discarded because they did not reach
cut-off points (i.e. > 7 for the relevant scale, and < 3 for the other two scales). Of the
remaining stimuli, 84 words (28 of each type) were chosen and divided into 2 separate
lists (A and B) so that each list contained 42 words (14 of each type). The two lists were
matched (at a sub-list level) for rating scores, word length, and word frequency
determined by Francis and Kucera's (1982) norms (see Table 3. 1., below). Lists A and
B were used alternately as TBR or TBF depending on the counterbalancing order (see
Procedure, below).
Additionally, 6 more words were used as practice stimuli at the beginning of the task,
and further 12 (6 for each list) were used as buffer stimuli at the beginning (3) and the
end (3) of the presentation of each list (see Table 3. 2., below).
Furthermore, all the selected word stimuli had a unique stem to be used in the WSCT
described below. The DFST was computerised and programmed with the E-Prime
Version 1.1 experiment generator package (Schneider, 2003). All the words were
presented in uppercase (Bold Ariel size point 30) on a Targa Visionary portable
computer (TFT 14" screen). Half of the stimuli in each list (A, B, practice, and buffer)
were presented in red ink and half in blue ink on a light grey (silver) background.
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Table 3. 1. Lists ofword stimuli used for the DFST.
























































































T=1.2 P=8.8 N=2.2 L=6.8 F=33.6 T=l.O P=8.5 N=2.4 L=6.3 F=33.6
(Table continues on the nextpage)
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Table 3. 1. Lists ofword stimuli used for the DFST {continued).





























7M.0 P=2.1 N=9.5 1=6.4 F=32A T=1.0 P=2.1 N=9.4 L=6.1 F=32.0
Note. T = Trauma rating score; P = Positive rating score; N = Neutral rating score; L =
Length; F = Frequency.
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Table 3. 2. List of words used as practice and buffer stimuli for the DFST.
Practice Buffer
1. Arrival List A - Beginning:
2. Edinburgh 1. Dusty
3. Festival 2. Giraffe
4. Garage 3. Book
5. Printer List A - End:
6. Supermarket 4. Mountain
5. Petrol
6. Universe








Word-Stem Completion Task (WSCT). For this task, the unique 2 or 3-letter word-stems
of the 84 test stimuli used in the DFST were matched with an extra 84 unique word-
stems beginning with the same letter and of the same number of letters. Thus, two new
lists of word-stems were formed (1 and 2) each containing lA of the stems from list A
and lA from list B (i.e. 21 "old stems"; 7 for each word-type, from each list) and 42
matched "new stems". Therefore, each list, 1 and 2, contained lA "old" and A "new"
word-stems, and each A "old" stem list, in turn, included lA TBR and lA TBF word-
stems. Lists 1 and 2 were randomised in two different orders and presented on paper
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with "inclusion" or "exclusion" instructions, as described above in Section 3. 3. (see
Appendix 4.).
Observer rating scale. This was usually used at the end of the experimental session.
• Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay, Fiszbein & Opler, 1987).
This is a widely used 30-item measure of positive, negative, composite (positive
- negative) and general psychopathology symptoms. It is designed to be
completed by the examiner based on third party information (consultation of
current multidisciplinary notes and discussion with keyworkers, in our case),
direct observation, and semi-structured interview (on a few occasions it was not
possible to carry this out fully for various reasons, in which case we had to rely
more on the first two sources). The PANSS has been shown to have good
internal consistency and inter-rater reliability: a = .73 and r = .93 for the positive
scale, a = .83 and r = .94 for the negative scale, and a = .79 and r = .84 for the
general psychopathology scale (Bell, Lysaker, Beam-Goulet, Milstein &
Lindenmayer, 1994; Kay et ah, 1987). For the purpose of this study, we used
scores obtained on the positive, negative and general psychopathology scales.
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3. 4. 4. Procedure.
Participants were tested individually with only the experimenter being present in the
room, the duration of the session ranging between approximately 1 and 2 hours.
They were initially asked if they had any further questions regarding the study based on
the information provided, and then to sign a consent form. The self-report questionnaires
were administered in the order given above. The instructions for the IES-R differed for
the two groups. Individuals in the psychosis group were instructed to complete the scale
in relation to their most recent psychotic episode and hospitalisation, unless participants
indicated that a previous episode (e.g. the first one) had been experienced as being more
stressful and traumatic. Participants in the control group were instructed to refer to the
most traumatic and stressful life event they had ever experienced. The approximate date
of the events was recorded for both groups.
Although the control group was not required to disclose the nature of their traumatic
experience, a number of people referred to events, such as nearly losing their new bom
baby, discovering that their long-term partner was having an affair, the sudden death of a
parent; whereas, a number of other participants who did not wish to disclose their event,
reported a very precise date, indicating that the event was very salient in their lives.
Moreover, the control group was not asked to fill in the RSQ, as this refers specifically
to psychosis.
After completing the questionnaires, participants were introduced to the DFST. The
portable computer was placed in front of them on a desk so that the screen was
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approximately 50 cm away, and they were asked to read the instructions on the screen
which were as follows:
"In this task some words will appear one at a time in the middle of the screen preceded
by a cross. Some of the words will be presented in RED and some in BLUE. Your task
is to PRESS the corresponding coloured key on the keyboard each time AS QUICKLY
AS YOU CAN, and also to try and REMEMBER THE WORDS. There will be a short
break halfway through. Before we begin there will also be a short practice with a few
words so that you can become familiar with the task."
These instructions were then rephrased by the experimenter, who also reassured
participants about this not being a memory test as such, and that given the number of
words nobody could actually remember them all, so that they were only asked to do their
best at remembering as many as they could, since, as one participant put it, "this is not to
see how good your memory is, but to see how memory works!". However, these
instructions were meant to create a situation of divided attention with competing task
demands (i.e. speed of response vs. trying to remember). Participants were also told that
a full explanation would be given at the end.
All word stimuli were preceded by a fixation cross at the centre of the screen for 1
second, were randomly presented, and the inter-trial interval (ITI), during which the
screen was blank, was 2 seconds. Each word was displayed until the corresponding
colour key was pressed. If by mistake the incorrect key was pressed, participants
received a feedback (a beep sound) to warn them, but the ITI remained the same and, as
participants pressed either key, reaction times were recorded.
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After a short practice, when the 6 words listed in Table 3. 2. were presented, there was a
pause for further questions, followed by the first part of the task. This involved the
presentation of 3 buffer words, then either list A or B, which were counterbalanced
across participants, and then 3 more buffer words, to avoid primacy or recency effects.
Halfway through the task there was a short break and participants were asked to try and
forget the words seen during the first part, "as this will help you remember the words
you will see during the second part of the task". During the second part, the remaining
list was presented using the same procedure, and participants were asked to remember
the words that they saw. In addition to lists A and B, the first and second part of the task
were counterbalanced so that half of the participants were asked to forget the words
presented during the second part, which "will help you remember the words you saw
earlier during the first part of the task".
Following the DFST (study phase) the WSCT (test phase) took place. This also had two
parts in order to apply Jacoby's (1991) PDP. During the first part, participants were
given either list 1 or 2 (in either of the two different randomised orders) on paper and
were instructed to complete as many stems as possible (without minding the correct
spelling) with words from the DFST (TBR and TBF) and otherwise with the first word
that came to mind (inclusion condition). This was followed by the exclusion condition,
during which the remaining list of word-stems was presented and participants were
instructed to complete as many stems as possible with "new words".
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The inclusion and exclusion conditions were counterbalanced across participants, and so
were the two versions of list 1 and 2, in order to avoid response biases due to
presentation order. No time limit was set for the completion of the WSCT.
In the end, the PANSS was completed and participants were debriefed and thanked for
their participation.
3. 5. Results.
3. 5. 1. Data reduction and exploratory analyses.
Data from practice and buffer words used in the DFST were removed from any analyses,
and variant spellings of test words were considered correct (e.g. Abused for Abuse).
Mean RTs, proportions of overall completion rates (old and new word-stems), and
proportions of correctly completed old stems, were calculated for each participant in
each experimental condition. Moreover, estimates of implicit and explicit memory
effects were computed by using the formulae reported above. Boxplots revealed a small
number of outliers (3.26%) randomly distributed across the variables of interest (i.e.
self-report measures and experimental conditions — including all of the computed
variables used in the subsequent analyses). These were dealt with through winsorization,
by substituting each outlier with the nearest non-outlier value of the corresponding
distribution (Winer, 1971).
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Following this procedure, further exploratory data analyses were carried out in order to
ascertain whether our data met the assumptions regarding normality, homogeneity of
variance and sphericity required for parametric tests. Normality was assessed by
examining the skewness and kurtosis of each distribution and by carrying out
Kolmogorov-Smirnov's Normality tests. Skewness and kurtosis were deemed to deviate
significantly from normality if their values were equal to or exceeded twice the
corresponding standard error (i.e. skewness > .86, and kurtosis > 1.66). Homogeneity of
variance and sphericity were assessed by carrying out Levene's test and Mauchly's test
respectively. Analyses revealed that some variables did not meet the assumptions
referred to above and consequently, where appropriate, standard data transformations
were applied in order to reduce the skewness, kurtosis and heterogeneity of variance.
Transformations were generally successful in dealing with the violations of the
assumptions for parametric tests. Tables reporting details of values before and after
transformations for each variable are presented in Appendix 5.
Due to our control group generally reporting very low levels on the self-report measures
adopted (particularly on the DASS-Anxiety, DES, IES-R-Hyperarousal, PANSS-
Positive and Negative subscales), assumptions of normality and homogeneity of
variance were not met for some of the variables of interest. Accordingly, relevant
variables were transformed using the method that yielded the best results in terms of
distribution and spread of data as indicated by Kolmogorov-Smimov's Normality test
and Levene's test of Homogeneity of variance reported in Table A. 5. 2., Appendix 5.
The following variables were transformed: Number of years since trauma, DASS
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subscales, DES (Taxon and Total), IES-R (except the Intrusion subscale), and the
PANNS-General Psychopathology subscale.
Analyses of the reaction time (RT) data from the DFST showed only a slight positive
skew for RTs in the psychosis (positive and neutral words) and control (neutral words)
groups (see Table A. 5. 3., Appendix 5.). However, since assumptions required for
parametric tests were met as indicated by Kolmogorov-Smirnov's Normality test and
Levene's test ofHomogeneity of variance, RT variables were not transformed.
On the other hand, data regarding the participants' general task performance on the
WSCT (i.e. the proportion of any word-stems completed) were substantially negatively
skewed due to both groups performing very well and generating a ceiling effect which
was not amenable to any kind of data transformation (see Table A. 5. 3., Appendix 5.).
This data set was not of direct relevance to our hypotheses, but rather it constituted a
general task performance check. The ceiling effect was expected and was deemed to be a
positive result indicating that the task was carried out with relative ease by both groups.
Nonetheless, since normality and homogeneity of variance assumptions were not met,
results were analysed by using non-parametric statistical tests.
Exploratory data analyses also indicated that data from 4 of the 12 experimental
conditions of the WSCT were not normally distributed in both groups (different
conditions in each group), and that for a minority of the variables (including computed
totals used in our analyses) Levene's test indicated that the variance was heterogeneous.
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As reported in Table A. 5. 5. (Appendix 5), it was decided to apply a natural logarithmic
transformation to the data in order to relatively improve the shape of their distribution.
Finally, with regards to the computed estimates of conscious and unconscious memory
effects, data largely met assumptions for parametric tests with the exceptions of a
minority of the experimental conditions in the control group (see Table A. 5. 6.,
Appendix 5). Since no transformation appeared to significantly improve data
distribution, variables were not transformed.
Throughout our analyses, whenever homogeneity of variance could not be assumed as
indicated by Levene's test, adjusted degrees of freedom were used to calculate the t
values in group comparisons. Similarly, whenever the sphericity assumption required for
ANOVA was violated as indicated by Mauchly's test, the relevant degrees of freedom
were adjusted to calculate the F values by using Greenhouse-Geisser's correction factor
(Epsilon). However, in view of the fact that a small minority of variables were not
normally distributed across the experimental conditions in either of our two groups, the
interpretation of some of our results should proceed with caution.
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3. 5. 2. Participant characteristics.
Table 3.3. Participant characteristics.
Variable Group Test P<
Psychosis (7V=30) Control (77=30)
Sex (M/F) 21/9 21/9 x2(i) = o.oo 1
Age 40.77 (10.55) 40.73 (10.53) *(58) = 0.01 .99
# of years since trauma 3.92 (2.51) 5.82 (4.22) *(58) = 1.29 .20
DASS
Depression 14.87 (9.45) 3.13 (3.22) *(58) = 6.24 .001
Anxiety 10.87 (8.08) 0.92 (1.57) -s. oo II o o .001
Stress 13.73 (8.05) 7.43 (4.60) *(58) = 3.26 .01
DES
Taxon 14.97 (12.10) 2.63 (3.28) *(58) = 6.54 .001
Total 24.65 (14.39) 7.08 (7.33) *(58) = 6.69 .001
IES-R
Avoidance 1.66 (.94) .56 (.55) *(58) = 5.65 .001
Intrusion 1.64 (.98) .80 (.71) *(58) = 3.79 .001
Hyperarousal 1.38 (1.03) .27 (.36) *(58) = 6.24 .001
Total 1.57 (.87) .57 (.56) *(58) = 5.51 .001
RSQ 62.08 (12.49) N/A — —
PANSS
Positive scale 15.97 (3.39) 7.00 (.00) *(29)a = 14.49 .001
Negative scale 18.17 (5.11) 7.00 (.00) *(29)a = 11.96 .001
Gen. Tpathology 48.60 (7.34) 19.77 (2.37) *(58) = 25.40 .001
Note. All the means and standard deviations refer to data cleared of outliers but
untransformed in order to aid comprehension and ease comparisons. DASS =
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale; DES = Dissociative Experiences Scale; IES-R =
Impact of Event Scale - Revised; RSQ = Recovery Style Questionnaire; PANSS =
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale; N/A = Not Applicable; a = Equal variances not
assumed - adjusted degrees of freedom. Standard Deviations in parentheses.
The two groups did not differ significantly in sex ratio, age, or number of years since the
traumatic event referred to in the IES-R. Also, as expected, the control group obtained
significantly lower scores than the psychosis group on all the clinical measures (see
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Table 3. 3. above). Since after transformation the data for DASS-Anxiety and IES-R-
Hyperarousal subscales were still not normally distributed for the control group, we
repeated these group comparisons by using non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests. Results
remained unchanged for both DASS-Anxiety U = 47.00, p < .001 and EES-R-
Hyperarousal U= 130.00,/? < .001.
3. 5. 3. Experimental tasks.
3. 5. 3. 1. Directed Forgetting Stroop Task.
Participants' accuracy on the DFST, as measured by the frequency of correctly and
incorrectly pressed coloured keys, was overall very good. Only 1% of the participants'
responses were recorded as incorrect, and these revealed no meaningful pattern across
groups or conditions. A summary of the DFST results (mean RTs and standard
deviations) indicating attentional resources allocated by the two groups to the three
word-types is reported below in Table 3. 4.
Table 3. 4. DFST. Mean reaction times (in milliseconds) for the two groups in each
experimental condition (Standard Deviations in parentheses).
Group
Word-type Psychosis Control
Trauma 945.23 (319.74) 777.47 (258.68)
Positive 927.67 (321.71) 772.53 (247.50)
Neutral 918.50 (320.40) 787.27 (284.12)
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A 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was carried out for the RTs data with Word-type
(trauma-related, positive, categorised neutral) as within-subjects factor and Group
(psychosis, control) as the between-subjects variable. Results indicated the absence of a
significant main effect of Word-type ^(l.80,104.60) = 0.64, ns (degrees of freedom
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected), and interaction ofWord-type x Group F( 1.80,104.60) =
1.59, ns (degrees of freedom Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). Conversely, a significant
effect of Group F(l,58) = 4.09, p < 0.05 was found; however, contrary to our
hypothesis, this indicated greater time latencies yielded by the psychosis group in each
of the three experimental conditions (see Table 3. 4. above).
3. 5. 3. 2. Word Stem Completion Task.
The two groups' general task performance on the WSCT, which consists of the
proportions of completed old and new stems (with any word) in the inclusion and
exclusion conditions, is reported below in Table 3. 5. As already mentioned in Section 3.
5. 1., these data were analysed by using non-parametric statistical tests. Between-groups
comparisons showed that, compared to controls, the psychosis group completed
relatively smaller proportions of word-stems in the inclusion conditions, significantly so
for old stems U = 288.00, p < .01 and total performance U = 297.00, p < .01. Within-
group comparisons (Wilcoxon tests with Bonferroni's correction) revealed also that the
psychosis group completed significantly smaller proportions of word-stems in the
inclusion compared to the exclusion conditions for new stems Z = 2.85, p < .05, old
stems Z = 2.84,/? < .05, and totals Z= 3.14,/? < .01 (see Figure 3. 1. below).
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Table 3. 5. General performance on WSCT. Mean completion rates of new and old





New stems .968 (.043) .990 (.016)
Old stems .973 (.037) .996 (.008)
Total .975 (.030) .995 (.008)
Exclusion:
New stems .989 (.015) .995 (.009)
Old stems .989 (.016) .996 (.008)
Total .989 (.015) .995 (.007)
Figure 3.1. WSCT. Mean proportions of new and old word-stems completed by the two
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Having analysed the two groups' general task performance, an overarching 2x2x3x2
repeated measures ANOVA was carried out with Condition (inclusion, exclusion),
Instruction (TBR, TBF), and Word-type (trauma-related, positive, categorised neutral) as
within-subjects variables and Group (psychosis, control) as the between-subjects
variable. Table 3. 6., below, shows the descriptive statistics (means and SDs)
summarising the performance of the two groups in each of the 12 experimental
conditions of the WSCT.
Table 3. 6. WSCT. Mean proportions of correct old stems completions for the two




Trauma .163 (.073) .204 (.099)
Positive .151 (.094) .183 (.085)
Neutral .102 (.063) .178 (.108)
TBF
Trauma .156 (.104) .176 (.082)
Positive .138 (.089) .206 (.098)
Neutral .106 (.067) .175 (.096)
Exclusion: TBR
Trauma .089 (.084) .035 (.049)
Positive .111 (.073) .064 (.054)
Neutral .105 (.078) .044 (.047)
TBF
Trauma .091 (.079) .030 (.048)
Positive .099 (.091) .068 (.076)
Neutral .086 (.054) . .058 (.052)
Note. All the means and standard deviations refer to data cleared of outliers before a
natural Log-transformation was applied.
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As expected, analyses showed a significant main effect of Condition F(l,58) = 79.99, p
< 0.001, reflecting the higher correct completion of old stems in the inclusion compared
to the exclusion condition in both groups. There was also a significant main effect of
Word-type F(2,116) = 5.28, p < 0.01, indicating an overall higher completion (with
words previously seen) of trauma and positive word-stems compared to neutral ones in
both groups. Additionally, we found a significant interaction of Condition x Word-type
F(2,116) = 6.96, p < 0.001, and Condition x Group F(l,58) = 24.74, p < 0.001.
However, the main effect of Instruction was not significant F(l,58) = 0.45, ns, which
indicated that the null hypothesis of no difference in correct completion rates for TBR
and TBF word stimuli in both groups could not be rejected. The main effect of Group
was also found to be not significant F(l,58) = 0.008, ns. In order to elucidate the nature
of the interactions between Condition x Group, and Condition x Word-type, we
performed post hoc between and within-groups comparisons. However, given the
absence of a significant effect of the variable Instruction, the two experimental
conditions TBR and TBF were collapsed.
Between-groups comparisons showed that the significant interaction Condition x Group
was due to the psychosis group's significantly lower completion rate in the inclusion
condition t(58) = 3.46, p < .001, and significantly greater completion rate in the
exclusion condition t(46.18) = 4.45,/? < .001 (adjusted degrees of freedom), compared to
controls (see Figure 3. 2. below). Moreover, within-groups analyses indicated significant
differences in completion rates between inclusion and exclusion conditions in both
psychosis t{29) = 2.72,p < .01 and control t(29) = 10.22,p < .001 groups.
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Figure 3. 2. WSCT. Mean proportions of old word-stems completed by the two groups









Orthogonal contrasts were carried out for the 6 experimental conditions reported in
Figure 3. 3. (below) in order to clarify the interaction of Condition x Word-type.
Of interest, results indicated that participants completed significantly more trauma and
positive word-stems than neutral ones in the inclusion condition F(l,59) = 14.58, p <
0.001, and significantly more positive than trauma word-stems in the exclusion
condition F(l,59) = 10.42, p < 0.001. Moreover, the main effect of Condition reported
above was again revealed by significantly higher completion rates for the three word-
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types in the inclusion compared to exclusion condition (all significant contrasts p <
0.001).
Figure 3. 3. WSCT. Mean proportions of old trauma, positive, and neutral word-stems





Having analysed the two groups' performance on the WSCT in terms of the proportions
of correctly completed word-stems in all the experimental conditions, we turned to
analyse memory effects on the WSCT and carried out an overall 2x2x3^2 repeated
measures ANOVA with Memory (conscious, unconscious), Instruction (TBR, TBF), and










and Group (psychosis, control) as the between-subjects variable. Table 3. 7., below,
shows the descriptive statistics (means and SDs) summarising the conscious and
unconscious memory effects for the two groups in each of the 12 experimental
conditions of the WSCT. Notably, participants in the psychosis group used slightly more
old neutral words to complete word-stems in the exclusion compared to the inclusion
condition, as indicated by the negative mean value (-.006) obtained in the Conscious
TBR-Neutral experimental condition.
Table 3. 7. WSCT. Mean estimates of conscious and unconscious memory effects for the




Trauma .075 (.108) .166 (.122)
Positive .035 (.112) .120 (.121)
Neutral -.006 (.104) .133 (.130)
TBF
Trauma .064 (.141) .151 (.110)
Positive .043 (.147) .134 (.118)
Neutral .025 (.083) .116 (.112)
Unconscious: TBR
Trauma .092 (.081) .041 (.057)
Positive .117 (.074) .072 (.062)
Neutral .099 (.071) .048 (.049)
TBF
Trauma .092 (.076) .033 (.052)
Positive .097 (.083) .078 (.088)
Neutral .087 (.049) .064 (.055)
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Results showed no main effect ofMemory F(l,58) = 0.65, ns. Also, once again we did
not find a significant main effect of Instruction F(l,58) = 0.23, ns, nor a significant
interaction ofMemory x Instruction F(l,58) = 0.15, ns, which indicates the absence of a
DFE across memory types, contrary to our experimental hypothesis. However, in line
with our hypothesis, analyses revealed a significant main effect of Group F(l,58) =
12.92, p < 0.001, and interaction Memory x Group F(l,58) = 23.96, p < 0.001,
indicating an overall lower use of conscious memory (M— .039, SD = .084 vs. M = . 137,
SD = .077) and higher use of unconscious memory (M = .097, SD = .046 vs. M - .056,
SD = .029) in the psychosis group compared to controls. Analyses also showed a
significant main effect of Word-type F(2,116) = 7.07, p < 0.001, and interaction of
Memory x Word-type F(2,116) = 6.07, p < 0.01, reflecting different memory effects
across conditions. In order to clarify the interactions between Memory x Group, and
Memory x Word-type, we carried out within and between-groups comparisons.
However, given the absence of a significant effect of the variable Instruction on explicit
and implicit memory, the two experimental conditions TBR and TBF were once again
collapsed.
Between-groups comparisons revealed that the significant interaction Memory x Group
was due to the psychosis group making significantly less use of conscious memory t(58)
= 4.67, p < .001, and more use of unconscious memory t(49.23) = 4.15, p < .001
(adjusted degrees of freedom), compared to controls (see Figure 3. 4. below). The
estimated effect size for the differential use of conscious memory by the two groups was
d = 1.04; whereas, for unconscious memory it was d = .95. According to Cohen (1992),
both these effect sizes can be considered to be large (i.e. > .80). Additionally, within-
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groups analyses indicated significant differences in conscious and unconscious memory
effects in both psychosis t{29) = 2.56,p < .05 and control t(29) = 4.66,p< .001 groups.










Orthogonal contrasts were carried out for the 6 experimental conditions reported in
Figure 3. 5. (below) in order to clarify the interaction ofMemory x Word-type.
Of interest, analyses showed that participants made significantly more use of conscious
memory for trauma-related words compared to positive F(l,59) = 5.27, p < 0.05 and
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neutral ones F(l,59) = 20.09, p < 0.001; whereas, they made more use of unconscious
memory for positive words compared to trauma-related ones F(l,59) = 11.24,/? < 0.001.
Moreover and importantly, the only significant difference in terms of relative usage of
conscious and unconscious memory for any given word-type was found to be for
trauma-related words F(l,59) = 5.76, p < 0.01, with a higher proportion of conscious
over unconscious memory being employed.
Figure 3. 5. WSCT. Mean conscious and unconscious memory effects for trauma,




















3.5.4. Correlation and regression analyses.
Zero-order correlation analyses with Bonferroni's correction for multiple tests (see
Table 3.8. below) were performed on the clinical measures adopted in this study so as to
explore the relationships between trauma-related distress, dissociation, levels of
symptomatology, and recovery style in the psychosis group. As expected Pearson's
coefficients (r) revealed a number of significant positive correlations between the
measures. Of interest, dissociation (DES) correlated significantly with the Avoidance
subscale and Total scores on the IES-R, our measure of trauma-related distress.
Moreover, the Stress subscale of the DASS also correlated significantly with the IES-R
(Hyperarousal and Total) and the General Psychopathology subscale of the PANSS.
Finally, it is worth noting that neither the RSQ nor the PANSS-Positive Scale was
significantly correlated to any of the other measures.
In order to test our final hypotheses, we carried out a series of multiple regression
analyses (stepwise method) on the data gathered from our psychosis group. Unless
otherwise specified, the independent variables entered in each equation were only those
measures that according to our hypotheses would be significant predictors for individual
factors. However, given the presence of more than two independent variables for some
of the regression equations reported below, a note of caution should be mentioned with
regards to the possibility that our sample size (N = 30) might be too small to reveal a







































































































































Note.DASS=epressionAnx etySt scal(D:Depression,i tytr s);Eissoc ativeExp i ncesc l (T:Taxon);EES-R=ImpactofvenSc leRevisedA:Av ida ce,:IntrusionHy rarousal,T t l);QRecovery StyleQuestionnaire;PANSS=o itivea dN gativeSyndromc l(P :Posi l ,g tiGPener l Psychopathology). *p<.05(2-tailed),Bonferroni'sco ection. **p<.01(2-tailed),Bonferroni'scor ection.
As expected, we found that scores on the DES were significantly predicted by total
scores on the IES-R (Adjusted R2 = .36, EX 1,28) = 17.63,/? < .001; Standardised /? = .62).
However, when the other measures were entered singly into the equation in turn, we also
found that scores on the RSQ contributed significantly to predict DES scores (AR2 — .13,
F(l,27) = 6.89, p < .01; Standardised/? = .36). Within this second equation model, IES-
R's Standardised [3 = .54 (p < .001). No further variable added singly to the equation
contributed significantly to predict DES scores. Moreover, we found that DES-T scores
were significantly predicted by scores on the IES-R-Avoidance subscale (Adjusted R2 -
.32, F(l,28) = 14.71, p < .001; Standardised [3 = .59). When the other measures were
entered singly into the equation in turn, we found that scores on the PANSS-Positive
scale also contributed significantly to predict DES-T scores (AR2 = .09, F(l,27) = 4.49,p
< .05; Standardised [3 = .31). Within this second equation model, IES-R-Avoidance's
Standardised [3 - .56 (p < .001). No further variable added singly to the equation
contributed significantly to predict DES-T scores.
It was also hypothesised that both trauma-related symptomatology and dissociation
would predict our experimental group's enhanced unconscious memory performance
(particularly for trauma-related material) and their recovery style (i.e. degree of sealing
over). We found that only total scores on the IES-R significantly predicted participants'
unconscious memory for trauma-related stimuli (Adjusted R2 = .13, F(l,28) = 5.35, p <
.05; Standardised /3 = .40); only scores on DES-T significantly predicted unconscious
memory for positive words (Adjusted R2 = .27, F(l,28) = 11.96,p < .01; Standardised[3
= .55); only scores on the IES-R-Hyperarousal significantly predicted our group's
overall unconscious memory performance (Adjusted R2 = .11, F(l,28) = 4.44, p < .05;
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Standardised [3 = .37); whereas, no significant predictors were found for unconscious
memory for neutral words. No further measures contributed significantly to the
equations once they were entered singly in turn with the above significant predictors.
Results also showed that participants' scores on the RSQ were significantly predicted by
total scores on the DES (Adjusted R2 = .20, F(l,28) = 8.31, p < .01; Standardised (3 =
.49). When the other measures were entered singly into the equation in turn, we also
found that scores on the IES-R-Hyperarousal scale contributed significantly to predict
RSQ scores (AR2 = .11, F(l,27) = 4.53,/? < .05; Standardised [3 = -.38). Additionally,
when IES-R-Intrusion was also added to the equation, it contributed further to predict
RSQ scores (AR2 = .14, F(l,26) = 6.91,/? < .01; Standardised f3 = .60). Within this third
equation model, DES's Standardised /3 = .54 (p < .01), and rES-R-Hyperarousal's
Standardised [3 = -.78 (p < .01). No further variable added singly to the equation
contributed significantly to predict RSQ scores.
Finally, we had also hypothesised that both enhanced unconscious memory performance
and recovery style would predict levels of positive symptoms in our psychosis group.
However, this hypothesis was not supported. Instead, only when all the other self-report
measures were entered into the equation as independent variables (stepwise method), the
DASS-Stress subscale was found to be the only significant predictor of PANSS-Positive
scale (Adjusted R2 = .18, F(l,28) = 7.36, p < .01; Standardised /3 = .46). This was also
true when DASS-Stress was entered singly.
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In order to test the possibility that the effects of enhanced unconscious memory
performance and recovery style on positive symptomatology might be mediated by
stress levels, we performed a final linear regression analysis with RSQ and unconscious
memory (by word-type and total) as independent variables and DASS-Stress as the
dependent variable (stepwise method). Results indicated that the overall enhanced
unconscious memory performance was the only significant predictor (Adjusted R2 = . 10,
F(l,28) = 4.37, p < .05; Standardised /? = .37). This was also true when it was entered
singly, thus supporting only in part ourpost hoc hypothesis.
3. 6. Discussion.
The first aim of this study was to investigate the pathway of trauma-related information
processing in individuals with psychosis. This was carried out in order to evaluate
experimentally some of the cognitive processes underlying the hypothesis that
dissociation occurring as a result of trauma (including the experience of psychosis
itself), may render individuals vulnerable to experiencing further psychotic
symptomatology (e.g. Allen et al., 1997). Specifically, we proposed that dissociative
processes may lead to poorly elaborated and contextually integrated trauma-related
information processing, poor awareness and voluntary control of stored material, and its
unconscious activation.
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As part of our model of trauma, dissociation and psychosis (see Figure 2. 1., Chapter 2),
we hypothesised that current levels of trauma-related distress in relation to the
experience of psychosis would predict the degree of dissociation experienced by
participants in our experimental group. This hypothesis was supported by our results in
that, as expected, we found that total scores on the IES-R significantly predicted scores
on the DES. Moreover, scores on the IES-R-Avoidance and PANSS-Positive scales both
significantly predicted levels of pathological dissociation (DES-Taxon scores). These
findings provide further support for the notion that dissociative processes tend to occur
as a response to subjectively perceived traumatic life events (e.g. Gershuny & Thayer,
1999; Kihlstrom, 2001; van der Kolk et al., 1996), and that the experience of psychosis
is traumatic in nature and can result in the development of significant trauma-related
symptomatology and dissociation (e.g. Jackson et al., 2004; McGorry et al., 1991; Shaw
et al., 2002).
It was further hypothesised that dissociation would manifest in our psychosis sample
through the alteration of attentional and memory processes. In particular, compared to
controls, we expected to find less interference (i.e. shorter reaction times) in the
psychosis group during the study phase (DFST) of our experiment, due to participants'
higher levels of dissociation and their presumed more developed ability towards
cognitive avoidance in tasks of divided attention (e.g. DePrince & Freyd, 1999; 2001). It
was also proposed that this would be the case particularly when responding to trauma-
related stimuli. However, against prediction, we found longer RTs in the psychosis
group and no main effect of word-type, which indicate the absence of an advantage of
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higher dissociation in the ability to perform when dual-tasking. On balance, the only
other study that found this facilitatory effect involved a non-clinical sample of high vs.
low dissociation college students (DePrince & Freyd, 1999); whereas, our clinical
sample reported severe symptomatology that may well counteract any potential
advantage (not to mention the side effects of antipsychotic medication). In fact, motor
retardation and generally slower RTs have been found in previous studies of individuals
with psychosis (Goldberg, et al., 2003). On the other hand, the absence of a word-type
effect might indicate that participants may have deemed necessary to sacrifice speed of
performance for the benefit of improving somewhat their memory performance. After
all, participants were unaware of the fact that time latencies were being recorded, but
they were aware of the fact that their memory for the lists of words appearing on the
screen would have been tested, somehow, at the end of the DFST. Consequently, this
last finding probably constitutes a methodological limitation of this study, in that we
attempted to test attentional processes by using a procedure that emphasised memory
functioning. As a result, it is possible that this may have obscured any selective
attentional processes (e.g. for trauma-related information) that might have otherwise
occurred at the encoding stage. Therefore, although we reject our hypothesis on the basis
of the findings obtained here, our study may be inconclusive with respect to the
existence of a facilitatory effect of dissociation when performing under conditions of
divided attention, a process that may come to light by adopting a different
methodological procedure.
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With regards to the effects of dissociative processes on memory functioning, one of the
main experimental hypotheses was that individuals with psychosis would exhibit a
reduced conscious and enhanced unconscious memory performance when completing
the word-stems during the WSCT. It was further proposed that this effect would be
particularly evident for trauma-related stimuli, which would indicate retrieval inhibition
and potential increase in vulnerability due to the increased unconscious de-
contextualised activation of trauma-related memories. The results of this investigation
supported the first part of this hypothesis, in that, the psychosis group made an overall
greater use of unconscious rather than conscious memory compared to the control group,
which showed the opposite pattern throughout the task and across conditions. However,
the enhanced use of implicit compared to explicit memory in the psychosis group was
not specifically larger for trauma-related material, but was generalised also to positive
and neutral items (see Table 3. 7., above). Instead, across both groups of participants, we
observed more conscious retrieval exclusively for trauma-related material, and more
unconscious memory for positive word stimuli.
Thus, our study provides support for the hypothesis that individuals with psychosis tend
to process any type of incoming information in a way that facilitates unconscious rather
than conscious retention, which may render them vulnerable to its activation without
awareness and voluntary control following external stimuli (i.e. in our case: high
completion of word-stems with old words in the exclusion condition), and it is also
concordant with Hemsley's (1996) cognitive model of schizophrenia which proposes
that individuals with psychosis exhibit a weakened ability to integrate information
within a temporal and spatial context.
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Since individuals with psychosis tend to encode information preferentially implicitly
rather than explicitly, the use of standard cognitive techniques (e.g. eliciting evidence,
modifying the distressing appraisal of beliefs) may not be as effective as perhaps
behavioural experiments, which may be more successful in accessing and modifying
emotional responses at both associative and schematic levels (cf. Power & Dalgleish,
1997). Moreover, clients may be unable to consciously access much of the content
covered during a session to attempt to implement it in-between sessions, hence the need
for repetition and written/audio materials.
Whilst our findings are consistent with previous studies of directed forgetting in PTSD
and DID clients, which found enhanced implicit but not explicit memory performance
for both emotional and neutral materials (Elzinga et al., 2003), and no retrieval
inhibition or better explicit memory for trauma-related material (e.g. Elzinga et al.,
2000; McNally et al., 1998; 2001; Zoellner et al., 2003), they might also highlight
another possible limitation of our study: the lack of ecological validity for our trauma-
related stimuli. Our experiment was obviously not set up to provide participants with a
surrogate traumatic experience, but rather to examine cognitive processes particularly in
relation to trauma-related information. Moreover, we did not take into account the
subjective appraisal of the trauma-related stimuli presented in the DFST, despite their
assessed relevance to trauma through a controlled procedure. One of the participants in
the experimental group commented that images might have been more effective than
words in eliciting emotional responses. Indeed, this is a very valid point and a change in
methodology in this direction would certainly add ecological validity to future studies.
Therefore, despite the content specificity found for trauma-related stimuli consciously
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recalled by participants across both groups, the generalisability of our findings to the
way people may process events that are subjectively perceived as traumatic should
proceed with caution.
Nonetheless, our hypothesis that, in people with psychosis, enhanced unconscious
memory performance (particularly for trauma-related material) would be significantly
predicted by levels of trauma-related distress and dissociation was largely supported.
In fact, total scores on the IES-R significantly predicted the use of unconscious memory
for trauma-related words, the DES-Taxon predicted the use of unconscious memory for
positive words, and the Hyperarousal subscale of the IES-R predicted our group's
overall enhanced unconscious memory performance. Therefore, taken together, these
findings provide support for a strong relationship between trauma and dissociation and
their involvement in individuals' cognitive processing styles. However, given the lack of
specificity for trauma-related content found in our experimental group's implicit
memory performance, the applicability of Brewin et al.'s (1996) and Ehlers and Clark's
(2000) models ofPTSD in psychosis is inconclusive.
We had also hypothesised that a DFE would be found in both groups in their explicit,
but not implicit, memory performance. However, analyses of the estimates of conscious
and unconscious memory effects revealed the absence of a DFE, in that, equivalent
correct completion rates for TBR and TBF stimuli were found in both groups regardless
of explicit or implicit memory contributions. It is possible that this finding may be due
to the methodological procedure employed in our study. In fact, in the standard version
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of the DFT, the test phase usually composes of a free recall; whereas, we employed a
WSCT with contrasting instructions asking participants to use, and not to use, the
material previously seen, following Jacoby's (1991) PDP in order to obtain estimates of
conscious and unconscious memory effects. Indeed, under these circumstances, a WSCT
is equivalent to a forced cued-recall in that participants are encouraged to complete as
many stems as possible. In this sense, task demands may act in the same direction as
those for a recognition task by facilitating retrieval of primed material (TBR and TBF).
In support of this interpretation, Basden et al. (1993) found that when the list method of
the DFT is used, a recognition test (but not a free recall) reinstates equivalent recall for
TBR and TBF items, due to the recall inhibition being released. Arguably, a DFE might
not be found in future studies with a psychotic sample even when adopting a standard
version of the DFT, because the implicit memory effect in this client group is larger than
the explicit memory effect. In fact, it could be possible to observe an inverted DFE (i.e.
people with psychosis may remember more TBF than TBR stimuli).
Since in our investigation we used verbal stimuli, according to Brewin et al.'s (1996)
model, these should have been dealt with and represented into a VAM system, having
received conscious processing. Thus, the higher use of unconscious memory exhibited
by the psychosis group in our study would indicate automatic retrieval of verbally
accessible information following the presentation of word-stems (a classic example of
priming and implicit memory). However, our task was not a typical task attempting to
assess implicit memory, since participants were aware of the nature of the task from the
beginning, and they were also given clear instructions which made explicit reference to
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the use (inclusion), or not (exclusion), of the material previously studied. As a result,
controls used predominantly conscious memory to perform in the task. So the question
remains as to what may have led our psychosis group to use preferentially unconscious
rather than conscious memory.
Our results showed that, compared to controls, the psychosis group completed
significantly more word-stems (with old words) in the exclusion condition and less
word-stems in the inclusion condition. Therefore, whilst controls were largely able to
correctly decide the origin of words used in the WSCT (i.e. presented during the DFST,
or just come up to mind), our experimental group exhibited source monitoring deficits.
Source monitoring, a deficit of which is a well known phenomenon in this client group
(e.g. Brebion, Smith, Gorman & Amador, 1996; 1997; Brebion, Amador, David,
Malaspina, Sharif & Gorman, 2000; Brebion, Gorman, Amador, Malaspina & Sharif,
2002; Nienow & Docherty, 2004), refers to those processes involved in making
attributions about the origins of memories, knowledge and beliefs (e.g. Johnson,
Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). Source monitoring decisions are based on certain
characteristics of the memories being judged, such as perceptual, contextual, and
affective information, strength (familiarity) of memories, and amount of cognitive
operations that were established during encoding of the memory traces. Thus, the more
distinct and the greater the amount of the above characteristics, the more accurate
decisions will be.
Given that source monitoring deficits imply that memory for imagined and perceived
events have similar phenomenological characteristics and entail the blurring of the
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boundaries between imagination and reality, our psychosis group's memory
performance on the WSCT appears to have been the result of either a dimmed external
reality and an abnormally salient internal reality, or a disruption of the comparison
process between internal and external events. Anyhow, whichever the mechanism, it
becomes apparent that the end result resembles closely some of the effects of
dissociation described earlier in this thesis (e.g. derealisation, detachment, absorption).
Consequently, we believe that dissociation is largely responsible for such a deficit in our
sample. In fact, as we have seen above, dissociation disrupts two key elements of
consciousness: awareness and voluntary control, both of which would be needed to
perform well according to the instructions in our task. This proposal is also supported by
the finding that dissociation was a significant predictor of the use of unconscious
memory in the psychosis group.
Accordingly, our results suggest that dissociation contributed significantly to our
psychosis sample processing verbal information (supposedly stored within a VAM
system in a verbal format) in a way that resembles the format that characterises
representations in the SAM system. However, since Brewin et al.'s (1996) model
predicts that it is only information represented in the SAM system that can receive no or
little conscious attention, lacks context, is poorly elaborated and can be patchy and
fragmented, this model cannot explain our findings, in that it does not account for the
potential effects of dissociation occurring at different levels of information processing.
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A potential alternative candidate may be Kennedy et al.'s (2004) cognitive model of
dissociation reviewed in Chapter 2., Section 2. 4. This model proposes that dissociation
may occur at different levels: automatic, within-mode, and between-mode, and draws
parallels with Brewin et al.'s (1996) model of PTSD. However, given the use of verbal
stimuli in our study, and assuming that this information was not dissociated at Stage I
(automatically), then, dissociation at Stage II (within-mode) which may result in the
severing of associative links among cognitive, behavioural affective and physiological
components of events would still not be able to account for our findings. In fact,
although the authors have referred to distinct sets of symptomatic manifestations, such
as (in the cognitive domain) intrusive thoughts and mind going blank, it is not clear how
this could explain what appears to be dissociation happening within (to use their
terminology) the cognitive domain itself. This being the case, none of the available
models considered can fully accommodate our findings. After all, none of them were
developed to account for psychotic experiences, and we would argue for the need of new
models specific to psychosis.
The second aim of this thesis was to explore the relationship between severity of
symptomatology - particularly current levels of the psychological impact of trauma (i.e.
experience of psychosis) and dissociation - and recovery style (i.e. integration vs.
sealing over (e.g. McGlashan, 1987)) in our clinical group. In this regard, our hypothesis
of a significant prediction of the psychosis group's recovery style (i.e. degree of sealing
over) by the measures of trauma-related distress and dissociation was only partially
supported by our findings. In fact, while the prediction of the scores on the IES-R-
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Hyperarousal (Standardised /? = -.78) and IES-R-Intrusion (Standardised ft = .60)
subscales went in the anticipated direction, since low scores on the RSQ indicate higher
levels of sealing over (i.e. individuals' sealing over recovery style was predicted by an
increase in hyperarousal but a decrease in intrusions), the prediction of RSQ by the total
scores on the DES (Standardised /? = .54) indicated the presence of a relationship
between the variables which went in the opposite direction to the one hypothesised (i.e.
an increase in sealing over was predicted by a decrease in dissociation levels). These
results are consistent with McGlashan's (1987) proposal that sealing over, as a
psychological defence, leads to difficulties in accessing memories of one's psychotic
episode, and also recent evidence that "sealers", compared to "integrators", report less
frequent intrusions as measured by the IES (Jackson et al., 2004). However, contrary to
what was hypothesised, our findings show a decrease rather than an increase in
dissociation for individuals who seal over.
The significant prediction of higher integration by increasing levels of dissociation may
be explained by the fact that individuals who integrate are necessarily trying to deal with
their traumatic experience of psychosis (hence the significant prediction of EES-R-
Intrusion but not IES-R-Avoidance) and, as such, may be more prone to dissociate in
order to buffer the level of distress, at least in the short term. On the other hand, it is
likely that the DES as a global measure of dissociation does not fully assess the
frequency of dissociative experiences occurring at a tertiary/between modes level, and
therefore it is possible that the employment of a more sophisticated measure that is able
to discriminate between different levels of dissociation, including their severity, may
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provide a pattern of results that is in line with our hypothesis. To this aim, Kennedy et
al. (2004) have sought to develop a new measure (Wessex Dissociation Scale) that is
theoretically based on their cognitive model of dissociation, although, to date, this is far
from being validated. Arguably, it is also likely that the RSQ may be a better measure of
the level of integration than it is of integration vs. sealing over, in that this questionnaire
asks individuals to express their views on issues regarding their illness when, according
to McGlashan (1987), in individuals who seal over "...psychotic experiences and
symptoms are isolated from nonpsychotic mental events and then made unavailable by
both conscious suppression and repression" (p. 681). Therefore, a self-report measure
does not appear to be the most effective mode of accessing information which has been
compartmentalised and made unavailable to conscious awareness.
Given the likely limitations of the RSQ, it is perhaps not surprising that the presence of a
linear prediction, proposed in our final hypothesis, of levels of positive symptomatology
by both enhanced unconscious memory performance and recovery style was not
confirmed by our data. Nonetheless, results indicated that the effect of unconscious
memory (but not recovery style) on positive symptoms may be mediated by raised stress
levels. Although this finding might be seen as supportive of stress-vulnerability models
of psychosis (e.g. Ciompi, 1988; Zubin & Spring, 1977), the vulnerability factor
considered in our study is psychological (i.e. the effects of dissociation on information
processing) rather than a biological one.
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In summary, our findings largely supported the first of the two CDI routes described in
Chapter 2, Section 2. 5. (see Figure 3. 6., below, for a revised version of our CDI
model). Specifically, dissociation (occurring as a result of the traumatic experience of
psychosis) and trauma-related distress predicted our psychosis group's enhanced use of
unconscious memory (though not specific to trauma-related information), which, in turn,
significantly contributed to the level of positive symptomatology when mediated by
stress levels. However, as we have discussed above, the dissociative processes involved
in this negative feedback loop appear to include mechanisms from both
primary/automatic and secondary/within-mode levels. In contrast, the second CDI route
which hypothesised the involvement of tertiary/between-mode dissociation and recovery
style in the maintenance of psychotic symptoms was not supported, although this may
reflect a limitation of the self-report measures employed in our study.
Thus, a vulnerable individual's attempts at dealing with stressful/traumatic events may
result in increased vulnerability and psychopathology (e.g. PTSD, psychosis), since the
common processes of PTSD and PTG (e.g. cognitive intrusions, dissociation,
hypervigilance) geared towards gaining an understanding of distressing experiences (an
innate need according to evolutionary psychology and trauma theorists such as
Horowitz, 1997; and Janoff-Bulman, 1992), lead to an exacerbation of symptomatology
when acting against a background of cognitive/emotional vulnerability. When an
individual's scarce resources (e.g. poor coping skills, lack of social support) are
inadequate for him/her to be able to make sense of their psychotic experiences, and
incorporate them within his/her existent models of the self and world, he/she may
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Figure3.6Acognitivemod lftra ma,diss ciationdpsychosis-Revise . Note.CDI=ognitive-DefensiveInterlock.
dissociate and, potentially, seal over. In this respect the CDI provides an empirically
testable framework which, along with existing models of psychosis, may be helpful in
formulating some of the basic factors involved in the formation and maintenance of
hallucinations and delusions. Of course, more empirical evidence of its existence and
modus operandi is needed.
3.7. Conclusions and future directions.
In this thesis we have attempted to address the complex issue of trauma, psychosis, and
dissociation. In particular, we have used methods from experimental psychopathology to
investigate the potential role played by dissociative processes in the maintenance of
psychotic symptomatology. The results of this study have been largely consistent with
the experimental hypotheses put forward earlier in this Chapter. Distinctively, the main
tenet of this thesis regarding the pivotal role potentially played by dissociative processes
in the formation and maintenance of positive symptoms, chiefly hallucinations and
delusions, has been supported by the preliminary evidence found in this study
concerning the involvement of dissociation in the unique cognitive processing style
observed in our psychosis group.
While our choice of methodological procedure and assessment tools might have
precluded the positive findings in support of some of our hypotheses, the experimental
tasks devised for this study were able to bring to light some of the cognitive processes of
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more immediate relevance to the core argument of this thesis (i.e. increased vulnerability
in individuals with psychosis due to their unconscious retention and retrieval of
information). Nonetheless, given the complexity of individuals' pathways to the
development of psychopathology, it would be desirable that future studies assess and
include participants' trauma history in order to evaluate its relative contribution to
current trauma processing compared to more proximal traumatic life events. As we have
seen in our discussion, none of the existing theoretical models considered above can
fully account for the enhanced unconscious memory performance observed in our
psychosis group, as this appears to have been the result of a combination of dissociative
processes acting at different levels of information processing affecting its
representational format and subsequent modality of retrieval. Perhaps, the exclusive use
of verbal material as stimuli may have been rather restrictive in that, it may have
precluded the involvement of lower associative and higher metacognitive levels of
mental representations in our investigation. Accordingly, it is recommended that future
research into trauma, dissociation, and psychosis examine cognitive processes for
complex stimuli (e.g. short vignettes, video clips) of differing emotional valence,
coupled with a multilevel test phase devised to tap into the presumed different stages of
dissociation and trauma processing, a comprehensive model ofwhich is long awaited.
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Title of project: The effect ofmemory on the way we feel




You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important for you to
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the
following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that
is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take
part.
Thank you for reading this.
What is the purpose of this study?
The purpose of this study is to find out how people, who
have experienced a psychotic episode, remember things.
We would be very grateful for your collaboration which
remember in daily life can affect the way they feel.
Do I have to take part?
No, your participation is entirely voluntary. Should you decide not to take part, your decision will not
have any effect on your present or future care.
You have time to think about your decision to participate. If you decide to take part, you will be given
this information sheet to keep and will be asked to sign a consent form.
Ifyou decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving any reason.
What do I have to do?
At the beginning, you will be asked to fill in some questionnaires which look at the way you have been
feeling recently.
Then, you will be asked to look at and remember some words appearing one at the time on a small
computer screen. Our meeting will last approximately 1 hour.
Results of the research:
This study will run for the first six months of the year 2004. All information will be entirely
confidential and only kept for the period of this research. Only properly authorised persons (e.g. your
psychiatrist) may have access to this information. Your GP will also be informed of your participation
in the study and about the nature of the research.
In due course, it will be possible for you to see the results of this research if you wish to do so (these
will not include individual findings, but the main results of the study).
You can contact me, Massimo Tarsia (Tel: 0131. 536 9460), or Mr. Ken Laidlaw (as independent
adviser, Tel: 0131. 537 6277) for further information.
Please ask if you have any questions.
Thank you for your help
have gone through stressful life events and




For each of the statements below, please circle the number which best indicates how much the
statement applied to you OVER THE PAST WEEK. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not
spend too much time on any one statement.
Not at all Some of A good part Most of
the time of the time the time
1. I found it hard to wind down. 0 12 3
2. I was aware of dryness ofmy mouth. 0 12 3
3. I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all. 0 12 3
4. I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g. excessively rapid 0 12 3
breathing, breathlessness in the absence of physical
exertion).
5. I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things. 0 12 3
6. I tended to over-react to situations. 0 12 3
7. I experienced trembling (e.g. in the hands). 0 12 3
8. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy. 0 12 3
9. I was worried about situations in which I might panic and 0 12 3
make a fool ofmyself.
10. I felt that I had nothing to look forward to. 0 12 3
11. I found myself getting agitated. 0 12 3
12. I found it difficult to relax. 0 12 3
13. I felt down-hearted and blue. 0 12 3
14. I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on 0 12 3
with what I was doing.
15. I felt I was close to panic. 0 12 3
16. I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything. 0 12 3
17. I felt that I wasn't worth much as a person. 0 12 3
18. I felt I was rather touchy. 0 12 3
19. I was aware of the action ofmy heart in the absence of 0 12 3
physical exertion (e.g. sense of heart rate increase, heart
missing a beat).
20. I felt scared without any good reason. 0 12 3





DIRECTIONS: This questionnaire consists of 28 questions about experiences that you may have in your daily
life. We are interested in how often you have these experiences. It is important, however, that your answers show
how often these experiences happen to you when you were not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. To answer




1. Some people have the experience of driving a car and suddenly realising that they do not remember what
has happened during all or part of the journey. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this
happens to you.
0% | | 100%
Never Always
2: ~ Some people find that sometimes they are listening to someone talk and they suddenly realiSfe that they did
not hear part or all ofwhat was said Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens
to you.
0% I | 100%
Never Always
3. Some people have the experience of finding themselves in a place and having no idea how they got there.
Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% I | 100%
Never Always
4. Some people have the experience of finding themselves dressed in clothes that they don't remember
putting on. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | | 100%
Never Always
5. Some people have the experience of finding new things among their belongings that they do not remember
buying. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | | 100%
Never Always
6. Some people sometimes find that they are approached by people that they do not know who call them by
another name or insist that they have met them before. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the
time this happens to you.




Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling as though they are standing next to themselves or
watching themselves do something, and they actually see themselves as if they were looking at another
person. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | 1100%
Never Always
Some people are told that they sometimes do not recognise friends or family members. Mark on the line
to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%| 1100%
Never Always
Some people find that they have no memory for some important events in their lives (for example, a
wedding). Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | 1100%
Never Always
Some people have the experience of being accused of lying when they do not think they have lied. Mark
on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%| | 100% -
Never Always
Some people have the experience of looking in a mirror and not recognising themselves. Mark on the line
to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%|_ | 100%
Never Always
Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling that other people, objects and the world around
them are not real. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | | 100%
Never Always
Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling that their body does not seem to belong to them
Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% I | 100%
Never Always
Some people have the experience of sometimes remembering a past event so vividly that they feel as if they
were reliving that event. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | | 100%
Never Always
Some people have the experience of not being sure whether things that they remember happening really
did happen or whether they just dreamed them Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this
happens to you.
0% I I 100%
Never Always
2 oM
16. Some people have the experience of being in a familiar place but fining it strange and unfamiliar. Mark
on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | 1100%
Never Always
17. Some people find that when they are watching television or a film they become so absorbed in the story
that they are unawareofother events happening around them. Mark on the line to show what percentage
of the time this happens to you.
0% ( 1100%
Never Always
18. Some people sometimes find that they become so involved in a fantasy or daydream that it feels as though




19. Some people find that they sometimes are able to ignore pain. Mark on the line to show what percentage
of the time this happens to you.
0% I | 100%
Never Always
20. Some people find that they sometimes sit staring off into space, thinking ofnothing, and are not aware of
the passage of time. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | | 100%
Never Always
21. Some people sometimes find that when they are alone they talk out loud to themselves. Mark on the line
to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% I | 100%
Never Always
22. Some people find that in one situation they may act so differently compared with another situation that
they feel almost as if they were two different people. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time
this happens to you.
0% I | 100%
Never Always
23. Some people sometimes find that in certain situations they are able to do things with amazing ease and
spontaneity that would usually be difficult for them (for example, sports, work, social situations, etc.).
Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | | 100%
Never Always
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Some people sometimes find that they cannot remember whether they have done something or have just
thought about doing that thing (for example, not knowing whether they have actually posted a letter or




Some people sometimes find evidence that they have done something but cannot remember having done
it. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% I J 100%
Never Always
Some people sometimes find writings, drawings or notes among their belongings that they must have done
but cannot remember doing. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | 1100%
Never Always
Some people sometimes find that they hear voices inside their head that tell them to do things or comment
on things that they are doing. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%| | 100%
Never Always
Some people sometimes feel as if they are looking at the world through a fog so that people and objects
appear far away or unclear. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% I | 100%
Never Always
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The Impact of Event Scale - Revised
Below is a list ofdifficulties people sometimes have after stressful life events. Please read
each item, and then indicate how distressing each difficulty has been for you DURING THE
PAST SEVEN DAYS with respect to , how much
were you distressed or bothered by these difficulties?
Not at all A little bit Moderately Quite a bit Extremely
Any reminder brought back
feelings about it
0 1 2 3 4
I had trouble staying asleep 0 1 2 3 4
Other things kept making me
think about it
0 1 2 3 4
I felt irritable and angry 0 1 2 3 4
I avoided letting myselfget
upset when I thought about it
or-was reminded of it
0 1 2 3 4





I felt as if it hadn't happened
or wasn't real
0 2 3 4
I stayed away from reminders
about it
0 1 2 3 4
Pictures about it popped into
my mind
0 1 2 3 4
I was jumpy and easily
startled
0 1 2 3 4
tried not to think about it 0 1 2 3 4
was aware that I still had a
ot of feelings about it, but I
lidn't deal with them
0 1 2 3 4
Vly feelings about it were
and of numb
0 1 2 3 4
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I found myselfacting or
feeling as though I was back
at that time
0 1 2 3 4
I had trouble falling asleep 0 1 2 3 4
I had waves of strong
feelings about it
0 1 2 3 4
I tried to remove it from my
memory
0 1 2 3 4
I had trouble concentrating 0 1 2 3 4
Reminders of it caused me to
have physical reactions, such
as sweating, trouble
breathing, nausea, or a
pounding heart
0 1 2 3 4
11 had dreams about it 0 1 2 3 4









Written below is a list of statements about your illness. Please read them carefully and
tick the box to show if you agree or disagree.
Agree Disagree
1. There was a gradual build up to me becoming ill.
2. My illness is not part ofmy personality.
3. I am responsible for what I think when I am ill.
4. I am not interested in my illness.
5. My illness taught me new things about myself.
6. I need help to solve the problems caused by my illness.
7. My illness was caused by my difficulties in coping with life.
8. I have had a nervous breakdown.
9. I can see positive aspects to my illness.
10. My illness has had a strong impact on my life.
11. 1 am not frightened of mental illness.
12. I liked some of the experiences 1 had when I was ill.
13. My illness has helped me to find a more satisfying life.
14. My illness came on suddenly and went suddenly.
15. _My illness is part ofme.
16. I am not responsible for my actions when I am ill.
17. I am curious about my illness.
18. I understand myself better because ofmy illness.
19. 1 can manage the problems caused by my illness, alone.
20. Others are to blame for my illness.
21. I have had a medical illness.
22. Nothing good came from my illness.
23. My illness has had little effect on my life.
24. I am frightened of mental illness.
25. 1 didn't like any of the unusual experiences I had when 1 was ill.
26. It's hard to find satisfaction with life following my illness.
27. My illness came on very suddenly.
28. My illness is alien to me.
29. I am responsible for my thoughts and feelings when I am ill.
30. I don't care about my illness now that I am well.
31. I want to be the person I was before my illness.
32. Others can help me solve my problems.
33. My illness was caused by stress in my life.
34. I have suffered an emotional breakdown.
35. Being ill had good parts too.
36. I'm not really interested in my illness.
37. I liked some of the unusual experiences I had when I was ill.
38. My life is more satisfying since my illness.





















Below is a list of word-stems. Each stem can be completed in several ways to make up a complete word.
For example, the stem "Pro" could be completed as "Profession", "Prompt", "Provide", "Proud", "Proof' etc.
Please try to complete as many of the following stems as possible by using ANY of the words presented to
you earlier (i.e. either to-be-remembered or to-be-forgotten), otherwise try to complete them using the first
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Note.StandardErrorfkewn ss=0.43;tanda drr rKu is.8 ;DASSpressionA xietyStc le; DES=issociativeExperiencesScal ;IES-Rmp ctfv nlR vis d;Q=o eryStyQuest nnaire; PANSS=ositiveandNegatiSyndromecal ;DSt ndardDeviation;df=gre soffr e o .


































































































Note.StandardErrorfkewn ss=0.43;tanda drr rKurt is8DASSp essionA xietyStc le; DES=issociativeExperiencesSc l ;IES-Rmp ctfv nalR vis d;SQ=o erytyQu sti naire; PANSS=ositiveandNegatiSyndromec l ;/AtApplicable;D=St nd rdDev ationdfgre sf freedom;.a=constantvalue,st tisticsc nnobecomp ted.

















































-Revised;SQ=coveryStylQuesti nnai e;PANSSositiveaN gativSyndromecal ;df=Degre sf freedom;.a=constantvalue,st tisticsc nnotbecomp ted.






















































































































Note.StandardErrorfkewness=0.43;Standa drr rKu is.8 ;
DASS=epressionAnxietySt sa
e;DES
=DissociativeExperiencesScal ;IES-RImp ctfv nR vis d;SQ=co eryStylQuest nnai e;PANSS =PositiveandNegativeSyndromc l ;/AtApplicable;LGN=o r thmic;SQRTquarer otINVvers ; REFL=eflected;SDtandardD via ion;dfegre soffr e om.


















































































































Note.StandardErrorfkewn ss=0.43;t rr rKurt si83;!
DASS=epressionAnxietySt sa
e;DES
=DissociativeExperiencesScal ;IES-Rmp ctfv nR vis d;Qo erytyQu st naire;PANSS =PositiveandNegatiSyndromc l ;/AtApplicable;LGNr thmic;QRTSquarr otINVve s REFL=eflected;SDtandardD viationdfgreesoffreedom;.aconstantlue,statisticsnnbmputed.



































































Note.DASS=epressionAnx etySt scale;EDissociativeExp rienc sSc l ;IE -R=mp ctfv Revised;SQ=coveryStylQuestionnaire;PANSSositiveaN gativeSyndroml ;/A= tApp ic ble; LGN=ogarithmic;SQRTquarerootINV=nve seREFLeflected;DSt ndardDevia ion;dfgreesf freedom;.a=constantvalue,statisticsc nnotbecomp ted.


























































Note.StandardErrorfkewn ss=0.43;t dr rKurt si8DFSTi ecteF g ttingt opTa k; RTs=eactionTimes;WSCTord-StemC pletionskInclu i n;Exclu ioSDt ndardDeviati n;
df=Degreesoffreedom.

























































Note.StandardErrorfkewness=0.43;Standa drrorKu si8DFSTi ectedF g ttingt opTa k; RTs=eactionTimes;WSCTord-StemC pletionkInclu n;Exclu ion;SDt ndardDeviati
df=Degreesoffreedom.
TableA.53Exploratoryd tanalysesforDFST(RT )+WSCGen ralPerformanceT t ls)-ot ansformations (continued). VariablePsychosisandControlGroup Levene'stestofP< Homogeneityfvariance(d ) DFST(RTs) Trauma1.15(1,58).29 Positive1.27(1,58).26 Neutral0.38(1,58).54 WSCT (General Performance) Newstems-123.66(1,58).001 Newstems-E17.99(1,58).001 Oldstems-131.46( ,58).001 Oldstems-E19.98(1,58).001 Total-130.09(1,58).001 Total-E16.12(1,58).001 Note.DFST=irectedForg ttingStroopTask;RTse ctiimes;W CTo d-StemC pl ionTa kI= Inclusion;E=xclusion;SDtandardDeviati ;dfgreesoffr e om.




























































































































Note.StandardErrorfkewn ss=0.43;Standa dKurt si8WSCT-StemComplet onTa k; TBR=oberemembered;Fforg tt nInclusioExclusi ;SDtandardD viation;df=gre s
offreedom.



























































































































Note.StandardErrorfkewn ss=0.43;t nda drr rfKurt si.8 ;WSCT- TBR=oberemembered;Fforg tt nInclusio ;Exclusi nSDtandard
offreedom.
StemCompletionTask; Deviation;df=grees
TableA.54Exploratorydatna ysesforWSCT(12experim ntalconditi ns+T tal )-b foretransf ations(co tinued). VariablePsychosisandControlGroup Levene'stestofP< Homogeneityfvarianc(d ) WSCT (12exp.cond.+tot ) TBR-Trauma-12.59(1,58).11 TBR-Trauma-E7.79(1,58).01 TBF-Trauma-11.60(1,58).21 TBF-Trauma-E8.63(1,58).01 TBR-Positive-10.03(1,58).87 TBR-Positive-E5.16(1,58).03 TBF-Positive-10.35(1,58).56 TBF-Positive-E2.31(1,58).13 TBR-Neutral-115.44(1,58).001 TBR-Neutral-E10.71(1,58).01 TBF-Neutral-13.57(1,58).06 TBF-Neutral-E0.02(1,58).88 Total-Trauma-11.30(1,58).26 Total-Trauma-E13.54(1,58).001 Total-Positive-10.33(1,58).57 Total-Positive-E1.16(1,58).29 Total-Neutral-17.80(1,58).01 Total-Neutral-E2.65(1,58).11 Total-13.05(1,58).09 Total-E9.04(1,58).01 Note.WSCT=ord-StemCompl tionTask;BRobremembered;F=f g tt n;IInclusio ;E Exclusion;SD=tandardDeviati ;dfgreesoffr e om.




















































































































































Toberemembered;BF=oforg tt nInclusioExclusi nLGNogari hmicSDtandardDeviadf Degreesoffreedom.
















































































































































Note.StandardErrorfkewness=0.43;t nda drr r
Curtosis=0.83;WSCTord-Stemomple ionTa k;BR
Toberemembered;BF=forgott nIInclusioExcl iLGNo ari hmic;SD=tandardD viationdf Degreesoffreedom.
TableA.5Exploratoryd tanalysesforWSCT(12experimentalc nditions+T t l )-b foretransf r ations(co inu d). VariablePsychosisandControlGroup TransformationLevene'stestof Homogeneityfvariance(d )P< WSCT (12exp.cond+t t ) TBR-Trauma-1LGN2.62(1,58).11 TBR-Trauma-ELGN6.93(1,58).01 TBF-Trauma-1LGN1.92(1,58).17 TBF-Trauma-ELGN7.49(1,58).01 TBR-Positive-1LGN0.04(1,58).85 TBR-Positive-ELGN3.87(1,58).05 TBF-Positive-1LGN0.16(1,58).69 TBF-Positive-ELGN1.98(1,58).16 TBR-Neutral-1LGN13.06(1,58).001 TBR-Neutral-ELGN9.00(1,58).01 TBF-Neutral-1LGN2.42(1,58).13 TBF-Neutral-ELGN0.17(1,58).68 Total-Trauma-1LGN0.92(1,58).34 Total-Trauma-ELGN12.72(1,58).001 Total-Positive-1LGN0.18(1,58).67 Total-Positive-ELGN0.72(1,58).40 Total-Neutral-1LGN6.36(1,58).01 Total-Neutral-ELGN2.18(1,58).15 Total-1LGN2.41(1,58).13 Total-ELGN7.90(1,58).01 Note.WSCT=ord-StemCompletionTask;BRobrem mberer;TBF= Exclusion;LGN=ogarithmicSDtandardDev ation;dfgreesoffr e o .




























































































































Note.StandardErrorfkewn ss=0.43;t a drr rKurt si8WSCTo d-StemCompl ionTa k; TBR=oberemembered;Fforg tt nConsciousUnconsciouSDtandardDevia idf Degreesoffreedom.
TableA.56Exploratoryd tanalysesfoWSCT(12mem ryexpe im ntalc nditions+Tot l )-tr sfo a i ns {continued). VariableControlGroup Mean(SD)SkewnessKurtosisKolmogorov-Smirnov's NormalitytestZ(df)
P<
WSCT
























































































































Note.StandardErrorfkewn ss=0.43;t drr rKurt si8WSCTo d-StemCompl ionTa k; TBR=oberemembered;Fforg tt nConscious;UnconsciousSDtandardDeviadf Degreesoffreedom.
TableA.56Exploratoryd tanalysesforWSCT(12memoryexperimentalc nditions+Tot l )-tra sfor ations (continued). VariablePsychosisandControlGroup Levene'stestofP< Homogeneityfvarianc(d ) WSCT (12mem.expcond+t t ) TBR-Trauma-C0.26(1,58).61 TBF-Trauma-C1.38(1,58).24 TBR-Positive-C0.12(1,58).73 TBF-Positive-C1.87(1,58).18 TBR-Neutral-C3.90(1,58).05 TBF-Neutral-C2.74(1,58).10 TBR-Trauma-U3.10(1,58).08 TBF-Trauma-U3.39(1,58).07 TBR-Positive-U1.50(1,58).23 TBF-Positive-U0.04(1,58).84 TBR-Neutral-U3.89(1,58).05 TBF-Neutral-U1.69(1,58).20 Total-Trauma-C0.26(1,58).61 Total-Positive-C0.12(1,58).73 Total-Neutral-C7.81(1,58).01 Total-Trauma-U10.35(1,58).01 Total-Positive-U0.40(1,58).53 Total-Neutral-U0.82(1,58).37 Total-C0.33(1,58).57 Total-U5.21(1,58).03 Note.WSCT=ord-StemC mpl tionTask;BRobrem mbered;Ff rg tt n=C nscious;U Unconscious;SD=tandardDeviati n;dfgreesffr e om.
